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Bragdon v. Abbott: ADA Protection for Individuals with
Asymptomatic HIV
Individuals living with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus
("HIV") face not only future illness, costly medical care, and
premature death, but also discrimination based on societal prejudice
and fear about the disease.' Whether federal anti-discrimination law
protects persons in the asymptomatic stage of HIV from
discrimination based on the disease has not always been clear. The
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA" or "Act")4 protects
individuals against discrimination based on disability in a variety of
situations, including employment and public services provided by
1. See ROBERTA COHEN & LAURIE S. WISEBERG, DOUBLE JEOPARDY-THREAT
TO LIFE AND HuMAN RIGHTS: DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PERSONS WITH AIDS 3
(1990) (describing this intersection of fatal disease and discrimination as "double
jeopardy"); see also Michael L. Closen, The Decade of Supreme Court Avoidance of
AIDS: Denial of Certiorari in HIV-AIDS Cases and Its Adverse Effect on Human Rights,
61 ALB. L. REv. 897, 906 (1998) (calling AIDS "the modem day equivalent of leprosy");
Michael Smithurst, Risk, Discrimination and Utility, in AIDS: A MORAL ISSUE 82, 83
(Brenda Almond ed., 2d ed. 1996) (noting that discrimination extends to those who
associate with HIV-positive individuals).
2. HIV infection occurs in three stages: primary, asymptomatic, and symptomatic.
See J. Michael Howe & Peter C. Jensen, An Introduction to the Medical Aspects of HIV
Disease, in AIDS AND THE LAW § 1.21, at 45-47 (David W. Webber ed., 3d ed. 1997); see
also infra note 46 (discussing the Bragdon Court's description of the primary and
asymptomatic stages of HV). An individual's current stage is frequently determined by
her CD4 cell count. See Howe & Jensen, supra, § 1.19, at 39. Produced by the lymphoid
organs, CD4 cells are white blood cells that are the main target of HIV infection. See id.
§ 1.6, at 12 n.71. A person in the asymptomatic stage of HIV infection has a CD4 cell
count greater than 500 and will have few symptoms, although virus replication is actually
continuous. See id § 1.21, at 46. The asymptomatic phase may last from months to years.
See id. For detailed considerations of the medical aspects of HIV infection, see P.T.
COHEN ET AL., THE AIDS KNOWLEDGE BASE (2d ed. 1994); MERLE A. SANDE & PAUL
A. VOLBERDING, THE MEDICAL MANAGEMENT OF AIDS (5th ed. 1997).
3. See John M. Vande Walle, Note, In the Eye of the Beholder: Issues of Distributive
and Corrective Justice in the ADA's Employment Protection for Persons Regarded as
Disabled, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 897, 900 (1998) (arguing that determining the
applicability of the ADA in any given case is more difficult than with other federal anti-
discrimination statutes because, unlike race or gender, disability involves a trait that not
everyone possesses); see also Julie Shapiro & David W. Webber, Access to Public Services
and Accommodations, in AIDS AND THE LAW, supra note 2, §§ 4.1-4.16, at 177-201
(surveying the federal protections against discrimination available to individuals with
HIV).
4. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-
12213 (1994)). For a description of the proposal and passage of the ADA, see Robert L.
Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a Second-
Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 429-34 (1991).
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private establishments.' The broad purpose of Title III of the ADA
is the elimination of both physical and attitudinal barriers from
places of public accommodation.6 To advance this goal, Title III of
the ADA provides statutory requirements governing building
accessibility and provision of services.7
The ADA prohibits discrimination against an individual "on the
basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any
place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or
leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation."" The ADA
thus offers HIV-infected individuals protection against
discrimination only if they are disabled within the meaning of the
Act.9 A disability under the ADA is any of the following: "(A) a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an
impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment."'1
Subsections (B) and (C) reflect Congress's desire to prohibit
discrimination based on a history of disability or the perception of
disability as well as discrimination based on an actual disability."
Determining the applicability of the ADA to individual plaintiffs
has proven difficult, however, because the ADA does not define
"physical or mental impairment" or "major life activity."'12 The
5. See 1 HENRY H. PERRIT, JR., AMERICANs WrrH DIsABILrTIEs HANDBOOK
§ 1.2, at 3-4 (3d ed. 1997). Title I of the ADA governs employment, see 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12111-12117; Title II governs state and local governments, see i- §§ 12131-12165; and
Title III governs places of public accommodation, see id. §8 12181-12189; see also
Burgdorf, supra note 4, at 434-92 (reviewing the content of the ADA).
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b); see also 1 PERRITr, supra note 5, § 6.1, at 246
(describing the general purposes of the ADA).
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A).
8. Id. § 12182(a). Additionally, the Act enumerates specific prohibitions on covered
public accommodations that impose a duty to modify policies, procedures, and structural
barriers in order to avoid liability. See id. § 12182(b)(2). Remedies and procedures under
the ADA are the same as those set forth under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See id.
§ 12188(a)(1); id. § 2000a-3(a). Injunctive relief is available and may include an order to
alter facilities or to provide services. See id. § 12188(a)(2). Punitive damages are not
available under Title III. See id. § 12188(b)(4); see also 1 PERRrIT, supra note 5, § 9.37, at
437 (reviewing damages available under Title III).
9. See 1 PERRrrr, supra note 5, § 3.2, at 38 (discussing the requirement of statutory
disability for ADA eligibility).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
11. Cf. School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273,284 (1987) (discussing Congress's pre-ADA
concern about perceived impairments).
12 See Burgdorf, supra note 4, at 446 (noting that the definition of "impairment" was
included in Congress's ADA bills but was deleted in the interest of brevity); see also 1
PERRrrr, supra note 5, § 3.2, at 40 (suggesting that Congress declined to provide a list of
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United States Supreme Court recently considered the applicability of
Title III of the ADA to an HIV-infected woman whose dentist
refused to fill her cavity in his office and told her that he would
perform the procedure at a hospital only if she paid for the additional
expenses.'3 In Bragdon v. Abbott' 4 the Court held that Sidney
Abbott was protected under the ADA because the infection
substantially limited her major life activity of reproduction. 5 In an
expansive reading of the statutory definition of disability, the Court
rejected the argument that whether a life activity is considered
"major" under the statute depends upon its daily character and
intimated that "substantial limitation" might include legal or
economic limitations resulting from a disability.' 6  Although the
Court held that Abbott's asymptomatic HIV was a disability, the
Court declined to decide whether asymptomatic HIV is a per se
disability.' Consequently, HIV-infected individuals will likely
continue to have to prove their disability on a case-by-case basis. 8
This Note discusses the facts of Bragdon, its treatment in the
lower courts, and the Supreme Court's resolution of the issue
concerning ADA coverage of asymptomatic HIV.'9 The Note then
considers past agency interpretations of the applicability of federal
anti-discrimination law to individuals with asymptomatic HIV. °
Next, the Note surveys the treatment of this issue in the federal
courts, from the early assumption' that the ADA covered
asymptomatic 1IV 21 to the split that arose when courts began
observing the close scrutiny of disability mandated by the statutory
definition.22 The Note then considers Bragdon's place in the line of
cases requiring an individualized inquiry into a plaintiff's disability
disorders constituting physical impairments because of the likelihood that new
impairments would develop in the future).
13. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998). Professor Closen argues that the
Supreme Court's failure to grant certiorari in HIV/AIDS cases prior to Bragdon
constituted an abdication of its responsibility to curb continued human rights violations
against those infected with the disease. See Closen, supra note 1, at 914. He notes that
since 1987 the Court denied certiorari in 25 cases involving substantive HIV/AIDS issues.
See id. at 900-01.
14. 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
15. See id. at 2206-07.
16. See id. at 2205-06.
17. See id. at 2207.
18. See id. at 2210.
19. See infra notes 25-79 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 80-116 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 117-39 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 140-96 and accompanying text.
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and the desirability of such inquiry over a per se rule. 3 Finally, the
Note argues that the Court's decision-based on Abbott's actual
disability-was preferable to a decision based on the "regarded as"
prong of the disability definition.24
Sidney Abbott was infected with HIV in 1986.21 In September
1994, she went to the dental office of Randon Bragdon for a dental
examination.26  Abbott was in the asymptomatic phase of HIV
infection, but she indicated her infection on a form completed when
she arrived at the office.27 During the examination, Bragdon
discovered a cavity and informed Abbott of his policy against filling
cavities of HIV-infected patients in the office.' He offered to fill the
cavity at a hospital, but instructed Abbott that she would have to pay
for use of the hospital's facilities. 29 Abbott declined and filed
discrimination claims against Bragdon in the federal district court in
Maine under both Maine state law and Title III of the ADA.3"
In its decision to grant summary judgment for the plaintiffs,31 the
district court found that Abbott's HIV infection qualified as a
disability under the ADA32 and that Bragdon had failed to raise a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the treatment of Abbott
23. See infra notes 200-42 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 243-67 and accompanying text.
25. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2200.
26. See id. at 2201.
27. See id.
2& See id.
29. See id.
30. See id. The Supreme Court considered only the ADA claims. See id. The district
court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff on the ADA and Maine Human Rights
Act claims, see Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580,592 (D. Me. 1995), affd, 107 F.3d 934
(1st Cir.), cert. granted in part, 118 S. Ct. 554 (1997), and vacated, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998),
but the ADA claims were the only claims considered on appeal, see Abbott v. Bragdon,
107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir.), cert. granted in part, 118 S. Ct. 554 (1997), and vacated, 118 S. Ct.
2196 (1998). A Title Ill ADA claim was available to Abbott because a dentist's office, as
a "professional office of a health care provider," is considered a public accommodation
under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (1994).
31. See Abbott, 912 F. Supp. at 584. Both the United States and the Maine Human
Rights Commission intervened as plaintiffs prior to discovery. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at
2201.
32. Relying on the weight of case authority and the ADA regulations, the district
court concluded that asymptomatic HIV is a physical impairment under the ADA. See
Abbott, 912 F. Supp. at 585. The court followed the majority of courts in concluding that
reproduction is a major life activity, noting that the regulations' representative list of
activities is not comprehensive. See id. at 585-86 (discussing 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1995)).
Finally, the court concluded that Abbott's HIV infection substantially limited her
reproduction because the ADA does not require a showing of a "direct barrier" to the
ability to reproduce. Id. at 587. The court noted Abbott's undisputed testimony that fear
of passing on HIV to a child led to her decision not to reproduce. See id.
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would have posed a direct threat to the health and safety of others."3
The First Circuit affirmed, 34 although it relied on different
information in determining that treatment of Abbott would not have
posed a direct threat.3
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on three questions: (1)
whether asymptomatic HIV is a physical impairment that
substantially limits the major life activity of reproduction for the
purposes of the ADA; (2) whether HIV infection is a disability per se
under the ADA; and (3) whether the direct threat analysis under the
ADA requires a court to defer to the professional judgment of a
health care provider as long as it is reasonable in light of current
33. See id. at 591. When a disabled individual poses a direct threat to the health and
safety of others, the public accommodation may deny services to that individual without
liability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3). "Direct threat" means "a significant risk to the
health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices,
or procedures or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services." Id. Whether a "direct
threat" exists must be determined based on the "current medical knowledge or on the best
available objective evidence." 28 C.F.R. § 36.208(c) (1998).
Bragdon's arguments supporting his "direct threat" defense focused on the likelihood
that HIV would be transmitted in invasive dental procedures, but the district court found
that he had no "quality evidence" to support his argument. Abbott, 912 F. Supp. at 588.
The court determined, however, that Abbott presented evidence concerning the absence
of risk that qualified as the "reasonable medical judgment of a public health official." Id.
at 589. The court relied on the testimony of the Director of the Division of Oral Health of
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC"), who stated that treatment was
safe as long as the dentist followed the guidelines provided by the CDC. See id. Some
commentators have suggested that the intersection of HIV/AIDS and the public health
care system has been particularly troublesome because of the need to balance "patients'
rights to privacy and nondiscrimination with collective rights to public health protection."
Lawrence 0. Gostin & David W. Webber, HIV Infection and AIDS in the Public Health
and Health Care Systems: The Role of Law and Litigation, 279 JAMA 1108, 1108 (1998).
34. See Abbott, 107 F.3d at 937. The First Circuit held "unhesitatingly" that
asymptomatic HIV is a physical impairment under the ADA. Id. at 939. Affirming the
district court's finding that reproduction is a major life activity, the court noted that the
meaning of "major" suggests that the key to determining whether an activity qualifies is its
overall significance. See id. at 939-40. The court stated that reproduction is of "singular
importance." Id. at 941. The court also affirmed the district court's conclusion that
asymptomatic HIV substantially limits reproduction, pointing out that an eight percent
risk of transmission of a fatal disease during pregnancy is a substantial restriction on
reproduction. See id. at 942.
35. See id. at 947-49. The presence of a "direct threat" had to be evaluated on the
basis of the medical knowledge available to Bradgon at the time. See id. at 943 (citing 28
C.F.R. § 36.208(c) (1996)). The court therefore rejected the district court's reliance on the
testimony of the CDC official because there was no evidence that the views he espoused
were public information at the time Bragdon refused to treat Abbott. See id. at 946 n.7.
Instead, the First Circuit relied directly on the CDC guidelines and on the policies for
treatment of HIV-infected patients promulgated by the American Dental Association.
See id. at 946.
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medical knowledge.36 This Note focuses on the Court's resolution of
the first two issues; the Court considered the third issue and
remanded the case to the First Circuit for a reconsideration of
whether Abbott's HIV infection posed a direct threat to her dentist.'
The first question presented the Court with an issue of statutory
36. See Brief for the Petitioner, Bragdon (No. 97-156), available in 1998 WL 4678, at
*i. The Court denied certiorari on two other questions: First, "'What is the proper
standard of judicial review under Title III of the ADA of a private health care provider's
judgment that the performance of certain invasive procedures in his office would pose a
direct threat to the health or safety of others?,'" and second, "'Did petitioner, Randon
Bragdon, D.M.D., raise a genuine issue of fact for trial as to whether he was warranted in
his judgment that the performance of certain invasive procedures on a patient in his office
would have posed a direct threat to the health or safety of others?'" Bragdon, 118 S. Ct.
at 2209-10 (quoting Petition for Certiorari at i, Bragdon (No. 97-156)).
37. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2213, on remand, Abbott v. Bragdon, 163 F.3d 87 (1st
Cir. 1998). After concluding that Abbott had a statutory disability, the Court considered
the direct threat issue and concluded that a court's assessment of the objective
reasonableness of the views of a health care professional should not involve deference to
the professional's individual judgment. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2210. In so holding, the
Court affirmed the standard established in School Board v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987),
that the existence of a "significant threat" sufficient to prevent liability for discrimination
must be determined from the perspective of the individual who refuses the
accommodation and that the assessment of risk must be based on objective evidence. See
Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2210 (citing Arline, 480 U.S. at 288). Applying this standard, the
Court concluded that the First Circuit was correct in declining to rely on the affidavits of
the CDC official because there was no evidence that his opinions had been published;
publication was necessary to make the opinions relevant as objective medical information
available to Bragdon when he denied treatment. See id. at 2211. Because the Court was
concerned that the First Circuit might have relied improperly on sources that did not
specifically assess the risk associated with dental treatment of an HIV patient, such as the
CDC Dentistry Guidelines, the Court remanded the case for a reconsideration of whether
there was a genuine issue of material fact about the existence of a direct threat. See id.
The Court noted that other evidence in the record not considered by the First Circuit,
including testimony from health experts, should be considered and might support the
decision of the district court in granting summary judgment for the plaintiffs on the issue
of direct threat. See id. at 2212. The Court suggested that remand was necessary because
it could not determine from the briefs and arguments exactly what medical information
was available to Bragdon at the time he refused to treat Abbott. See id.
Although he did not believe that remand was necessary, Justice Stevens, joined by
Justice Breyer, concurred in the opinion of the Court in order to provide a judgment
supported by a majority. See id. at 2213 (Stevens, J., concurring). Chief Justice Rehnquist
agreed that the direct threat issue should be remanded, but he disagreed with the Court's
reasoning. See id. at 2216 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part). The Chief Justice quarreled with the Court's determination that the
reasonableness of a health care provider's judgments should be assessed in light of the
views of public health officials. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part). He argued that because of the severity of the risk posed by
HIV infection and the unavailability of procedures for eliminating the risk, a dental care
provider's determination that an HIV-infected patient posed a direct threat would likely
be found "objectively reasonable." Id. at 2217 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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interpretation. Writing for the Court,3" Justice Kennedy broke the
present disability analysis into a three-step inquiry:39  (1) was
Abbott's HIV infection a physical impairment; (2) does reproduction
constitute a major life activity; and (3) did HIV infection
substantially limit reproduction.4" The ADA provides no definition
for physical impairment, so the Court looked to the regulations
interpreting the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Rehabilitation Act") 41
that enumerate body systems which, if affected, constitute
38. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined in the opinion of the Court.
See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2200. Justice Stevens wrote a concurring opinion in which
Justice Breyer joined. See id. at 2213 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg
concurred separately. See id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote an
opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which Justices Scalia
and Thomas joined, and in part of which Justice O'Connor joined. See id. at 2214
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Justice
O'Connor wrote separately, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. See
id. at 2217 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
39. See id. at 2202 (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994)). At oral argument,
the petitioner conceded that the "regarded as" issue was raised in the First Circuit. See
Transcript of Oral Argument, Bragdon (No. 97-156), available in 1998 WL 141165, at *6.
Because the Court determined that Abbott's HIV infection was a disability under
subsection (A), it did not consider whether the HIV infection qualified under the other
two subsections. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2201.
40. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2202.
41. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-7961
(West 1998)). The Rehabilitation Act imposes duties similar to those under the ADA on
the federal government and programs receiving federal assistance, but with the enactment
of the ADA, Congress extended the protections of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to the
general public. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 794; 1 PERRITr, supra note 5, § 6.1, at 246; see also 1 id.
§§ 2.1-2.8, at 19-34 (providing an overview of the legislative history behind the enactment
of the ADA). The Rehabilitation Act provides: "No otherwise qualified individual with a
disability ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .... ." 29 U.S.C.A. § 794(a).
Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act in 1998. See Rehabilitation Act Amendments
of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-220, §§ 402-414, 112 Stat. 1092, 1092-242 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-7961 (West 1998)). Prior to the amendment, the definition of
"disability" under the Rehabilitation Act was identical to the definition of "disability"
under the ADA. See 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1994); 1 PERRrrr, supra note 5, § 1.2, at 4; see
also supra text accompanying note 10 (quoting the ADA definition of "disability").
Therefore, courts interpreting the ADA have relied heavily on Rehabilitation Act
precedent. See, e.g., Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston Store, 924 F. Supp. 763, 773 n.18
(E.D. Tex. 1996) (affirming the relevance of Rehabilitation Act case law to the
interpretation of the ADA); see also 28 C.F.R. § 36.103(a) (1998) (providing Department
of Justice ("DOJ") regulations implementing Title III and stating that Rehabilitation Act
precedent sets the floor for the protections provided by the ADA). Although the new
definition of "disability" under the Rehabilitation Act no longer mirrors the ADA
definition, see 29 U.S.C.A. § 705(9) (West 1998), this Note considers only Rehabilitation
Act regulations and cases that interpret the earlier disability definition because of their
relevance to the interpretation of the identical definition in the ADA.
1272 [Vol. 77
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impairment.42 The regulations define physical or mental impairment
as "[a]ny physiological disorder or condition ... affecting one or
more of the following body systems: Neurological; musculoskeletal;
special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs;
cardiovascular; reproductive; digestive; genitourinary; hemic and
lymphatic; skin; and endocrine."'43
The Department of Justice ("DOJ") incorporated into the
Rehabilitation Act regulations a representative list of conditions that
qualify as impairments.44 The Court attributed the absence of HIV
from the representative list to the fact that HIV was not known to be
the cause of AIDS when the regulations were originally promulgated
and concluded that HIV infection falls within the definition provided
by the regulations.45  After tracing the various stages of HIV
infection,46 the Court noted that calling the second phase the
"asymptomatic" phase "is a misnomer, in some respects, for clinical
features persist throughout, including lymphadenopathy,
42. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2202; 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(1) (1998). The regulations
were originally promulgated by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in
1977, but the definition of physical impairment in those regulations was adopted verbatim
by the Attorney General in 1980 when the responsibility for enforcing § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act was transferred to that office. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2202-03.
Similarly, the Attorney General was charged with issuing regulations to implement the
provisions of Title III of the ADA, see 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b) (1994), and has adopted the
Rehabilitation Act definitions, see 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1998). At oral argument, the
petitioner essentially conceded that asymptomatic HIV is an impairment. See Transcript
of Oral Argument, Bragdon (No. 97-156), available in 1998 WL 141165, at *15 ("And
[HIV infection] almost certainly is a physical or mental impairment.").
43. 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(1).
44. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2202 (discussing 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(1) (1997)). The
regulations provide that impairment "includes, but is not limited to, such diseases and
conditions as orthopedic, visual, speech, and hearing impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy,
muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, diabetes, mental retardation,
emotional illness, and drug addiction and alcoholism." 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(1) (1998).
45. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2203. Unlike the Rehabilitation Act regulations, the
ADA regulations include symptomatic and asymptomatic HIV on the list of
representative impairments, but the Court did not discuss the ADA regulations until later
in the opinion. See id. at 2209 (discussing 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(1)(iii) (1997)).
46. The Court engaged in a lengthy analysis of the various stages of HIV infection and
their symptoms. See id. at 2203-04. The initial stage is called "acute or primary" infection
and lasts about three months. Id- at 2203. The assault on the immune system begins
immediately, as evidenced by a sudden decline in the white blood cell count. See id. An
individual in this stage of the illness experiences symptoms such as fever, muscle pain, and
gastrointestinal disorders. See id. The next phase of infection is the asymptomatic phase,
during which the virus concentrates in the lymph nodes, where viral production continues.
See icL at 2204. The white blood cell count continues to drop during this phase, and when
it reaches a certain level the individual will be said to have full-blown AIDS. See id.; see
also supra note 2 (describing the asymptomatic phase).
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dermatological disorders, oral lesions, and bacterial infections. 4 7
Because HIV's detrimental effect on the blood and the lymphatic
system begins with the initial infection and persists throughout the
various stages, the Court held that HIV is an "impairment from the
moment of infection."'
The Court's recognition that HIV is a physical impairment
established only one of the requirements for disability under the
ADA. 9 The Court then turned to the major life activity analysis
required by the statute." Regarding the meaning of "major life
activities," the Rehabilitation Act and ADA regulations provide that
the phrase "means functions such as caring for one's self, performing
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning,
and working."'" Because the lower courts treated the case as one in
which reproduction was the major life activity in question and that
issue was raised in the petition for certiorari, the Court limited its
analysis to that claim. 2  The Court easily concluded that
reproduction meets the ADA definition of "major life activity,"
noting that "[r]eproduction and the sexual dynamics surrounding it
are central to the life process itself."'53 In so holding, the Court
rejected Bragdon's argument that "major life activity" is limited to
activities with a "public, economic, or daily character."'54 In support
of its determination that the definition is not as narrow as Bragdon
argued, the Court noted that activities included on the regulation's
representative list such as "caring for one's self" have no economic or
public character.5
47. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2204.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 2202 (breaking the statutory definition into a three-step inquiry).
50. See id. at 2204.
51. 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(2) (1998); id. § 36.104.
51 See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2205. The Court acknowledged that respondents and
amici made arguments that HIV affected not only reproduction but also "almost every
phase of the infected person's life." Id. The Court also noted that "it may seem legalistic"
to limit its discussion to reproduction, stating that it had "little doubt that had different
parties brought the suit they would have maintained that an HIV infection imposes
substantial limitations on other major life activities." Id. Thus, it was seemingly with
some reluctance that Justice Kennedy limited his analysis to reproduction. See id. The
respondent acknowledged at oral argument that she had not produced specific testimony
of substantial limitation of any major life activity other than reproduction. See Transcript
of Oral Argument, Bragdon (No. 97-156), available in 1998 WL 141165, at *39-40.
53. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2205.
54. Id. (citing Brief for the Petitioner, Bragdon (No. 97-156), available in 1998 WL
4678, at *14, *28, *30, *31).
55. See id. at 2205. Justice Kennedy also noted that the definition in the regulations
provides for activities "such as" the enumerated ones and thus the list cannot be
exhaustive. See id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(2); 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1997)).
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After deciding that Abbott's asymptomatic HIV satisfied the
first two elements of a disability under the ADA, the Court had only
to consider whether HIV infection substantially limits reproduction.
The Court determined that Abbott's asymptomatic HIV substantially
limited her ability to reproduce both because of the risk to the sexual
partner and because of the risk of perinatal transmission to the
unborn child.56 Even assuming that the risk of perinatal transmission
could be reduced to eight percent by current medications, the Court
determined that HIV infection could still be recognized as
substantially limiting reproduction.' The Court stated that
"limitation" does not mean "inability" and noted that the economic
and legal effects of choosing to reproduce while infected with HIV
could constitute significant limitations.5 8  Affirming that "the
disability definition does not turn on personal choice," the Court
suggested that even when an HIV-infected individual chooses to
reproduce, her reproduction might still be substantially limited by the
virus.59 The Court noted, however, that this scenario did not apply in
this case, due to Abbott's uncontested testimony that she decided not
to have a child because of her HIV infection.6° Because the Court
concluded that Abbott's HIV infection qualified as a disability under
the ADA, as it significantly limited the major life activity of
reproduction, it declined to reach the issue of whether HIV is a per se
56. See id. at 2206. The Court cited the cumulative results of 13 studies on HIV
transmission which suggest that 20% of male partners of HIV-positive women become
infected. See id. The petitioner conceded the risk to children of HIV-infected mothers is
about 25%. See id. (citing Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 942 (1st Cir.), cert. granted in
part, 118 S. Ct. 554 (1997), and vacated, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998); 912 F. Supp. 580, 587 n.6
(D. Me. 1995)).
57. See id.
58. Id. The economic effects refer to the cost of antiretroviral treatment and
insurance and health care costs if the child of an HIV-infected mother acquires the virus.
See id. In suggesting that there may be legal effects, the Court noted that "[t]he laws of
some States, moreover, forbid persons infected with HIV from having sex with others,
regardless of consent." Id. The Court cited statutes of several states in support of this
proposition. See id. None of the cited statutes, however, expressly forbids an HIV-
infected individual from engaging in sexual relations; rather, these statutes prevent a
person with a communicable disease from knowingly exposing another to infection. See,
e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 139.31 (West 1997) (providing that "[a]ny person who knowingly
exposes another to infection from any communicable disease ... shall be liable for all
damages resulting therefrom"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-18-112 (1997) ("A person
infected with a sexually transmitted disease may not knowingly expose another person to
infection."). For a survey of state laws affecting HIV-infected individuals, see Gostin &
Webber, supra note 33, at 1108.
59. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2206.
60. See id.
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disability under the ADA.6
In support of its holdings, the Court considered agency and
judicial interpretations of the Rehabilitation Act.62 The Court noted
that all courts and agencies considering the issue prior to the
enactment of the ADA had ruled that HIV was a handicap under the
Rehabilitation Act, and the Court stated that Congress endorsed that
interpretation when it incorporated Rehabilitation Act definitions
into the ADA.63 The Court then turned to the ADA regulations
promulgated by the DOJ, which add to the regulatory definition
developed for the Rehabilitation Act the provision that
asymptomatic HIV infection constitutes a physical impairment.6'
Additionally, the Court noted, other agencies responsible for
interpreting the other ADA titles have reached the same
61. See id. at 2207. Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that Abbott had not proved
substantial limitation of her reproductive activities because she produced no evidence that
prior to her H1V infection, reproduction was among one of her major life activities. See
id. at 2214-15 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
The Chief Justice implied that proof of a substantial limitation on reproduction required a
showing that if not for the HIV infection, Abbott would be reproducing. See id. at 2215
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
62- See id at 2207-08. Among other interpretations, the Court cited a 1988 opinion of
the Office of Legal Counsel, which asserted that asymptomatic HIV is covered under the
Rehabilitation Act and that the virus substantially limits the major life activity of
reproduction. See id. at 2207 (citing Application of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
to HIV-Infected Individuals, 12 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 264, 264-65 (1988)). The Court
stated that it "need not pause" to consider if Chevron deference to agency interpretations
was required when responsibility for administration of a statute has been delegated to
more than one agency. Id. (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)). The Court noted, however, "that the well-
reasoned views of the agencies implementing a statute 'constitute a body of experience
and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.' "
Id. (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). Because it did not reach
the issue of per se disability, the Court paid little attention to the legislative history of the
ADA, but much of the Petitioner's and Respondent's briefs focused on the issue of
congressional intent. See Brief for the Petitioner, Bragdon (No. 97-156), available in 1998
WL 4678, at *19-27; Brief for the Respondent Sidney Abbott, Bragdon (No. 97-156),
available in 1998 WL 47514, at *14-17, *28-35.
63. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2208. The Court emphasized the uniformity in judicial
opinions concerning whether HIV infection is covered by the Rehabilitation Act. See id.;
see also, e.g., Martinez v. School Bd., 861 F.2d 1502, 1506 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that the
Rehabilitation Act protects an HIV-infected student without distinguishing between the
symptomatic and asymptomatic stages); Ray v. School Dist., 666 F. Supp. 1524,1536 (M.D.
Fla. 1987) (holding that the Rehabilitation Act protects asymptomatic HIV-infected
students). The Court did not, however, mention the lack of judicial uniformity in the
courts of appeals interpreting the ADA. See infra notes 140-96 and accompanying text
(discussing the split among the courts of appeals on the issue of ADA protection for
asymptomatic HIV-infected individuals).
64. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2209 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(1)(iii) (1997)).
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conclusion.65
Justice Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion in which she
emphasized that HIV is "a disease limiting life itself. '66 Justice
Ginsburg noted the inevitability of the disease's effect on major life
activities, including "the need for and ... the ability to obtain health
care because of the reaction of others to the impairment." 67 Because
of this inevitable effect on life choices, she agreed that HIV infection
meets the statutory definition of disability.6"
Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred in the judgment of the Court
remanding the case to the First Circuit for a consideration of whether
Abbott's HIV infection posed a direct threat to a dental care
provider.6 9 He dissented, however, from the Court's holding that
Abbott's asymptomatic HIV was a disability under the ADA.70
Initially, Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized that whether Abbott
had a disability falling within the ADA's coverage was an
individualized inquiry.71 The Chief Justice disagreed with the Court's
analysis in two of the three steps required for a finding of disability.72
Asserting that Bragdon had not disputed that asymptomatic HIV was
a physical impairment, Chief Justice Rehnquist assumed that the
65. See id. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") is
responsible for issuing regulations implementing Title I of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12116 (1994). The Attorney General is responsible for regulations implementing the
public services provisions of Title II. See id. § 12134(a). The Secretary of Transportation
is authorized to issue regulations implementing the transportation provisions of Titles II
and III. See id. §§ 12149, 12164, 12186. The Court noted that the EEOC had even
concluded that an individual with HIV has a disability. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2209
(citing 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 902.4(c)(1), at 35 (Mar. 1995)).
66. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2213 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Stevens wrote a
separate concurring opinion in which he asserted that although he agreed with Justice
Kennedy's analysis, he would have affirmed the First Circuit altogether rather than
remanding the direct threat issue. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring). He joined the opinion
of the Court "in order to provide a judgment supported by a majority." Id. (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
67. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
68. See id. at 2213-14 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
69. See id. at 2216 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part). The Chief Justice disagreed, however, with the Court's direct threat analysis,
rejecting the notion that the opinions of public health officials should be given special
deference in the assessment of risk. See id. at 2216-17 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part); see also supra note 37 (discussing the Chief
Justice's analysis of the direct threat issue).
70. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2216 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part).
71. See id. at 2214 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
72. See id. at 2214-16 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
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definition's first requirement was met.73
Turning to the identification of a major life activity, the Chief
Justice concluded that the majority's opinion was flawed because it
failed to conduct a specific, individualized inquiry to determine that
reproduction was a major life activity for Abbott. He asserted that
the ADA requirement that the disabled individual's limited major
life activity "be one 'of such individual'" necessitates an
individualized analysis.74 Additionally, Chief Justice Rehnquist
rejected the conclusion that reproduction is a major life activity
under a general analysis.75 He quarreled with the majority's focus on
the qualitative implications of the word "major" as opposed to its
quantitative implications.76 He argued that the frequency of an
activity, not its "[f]undamental importance," determines whether it
falls within the category of major life activity: "The common thread
[in the regulation's enumerated activities] is ... that the activities are
repetitively performed and essential in the day-to-day existence of a
normally functioning individual."77  Even if reproduction were a
major life activity, the Chief Justice concluded, the third requirement
of the disability definition was not satisfied because HIV infection
does not substantially limit reproduction.78 There is no substantial
limitation, he reasoned, because HIV-infected individuals are
physically able to reproduce although they may choose not to
reproduce.79
73. See id. at 2214 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
74. Id (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994)).
75. See id. at 2215 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part). Initially the Chief Justice quarreled with the notion that reproduction is an
activity: "Calling reproduction a major life activity is somewhat inartful. Reproduction is
not an activity at all, but a process." Id. at 2215 n.2 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part). He noted, "One could be described as breathing,
walking, or performing manual tasks, but a human being (as opposed to a copier machine
or a gremlin) would never be described as reproducing." Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
76. See id. at 2215 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
77. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
78. See id. at 2215-16 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
79. See id. at 2216 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part). Justice O'Connor did not join in Chief Justice Rehnquist's analysis of HIV and
the disability definition. In a separate opinion, she agreed with the Chief Justice that
reproduction is not a major life activity and that the ADA requires an individualized
analysis of disability, but she asserted that the "substantial limitation" analysis was
unnecessary in light of these conclusions. See id. at 2217-18 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
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In reviewing the statutory framework behind the Bragdon
decision, it should be noted that neither the ADA nor the
Rehabilitation Act provide direct guidance as to the applicability of
their provisions to HIV-infected individuals."0 Although Congress
did not expressly define HIV as a disability, or even as a physical
impairment,8' it seemingly would have known about past agency
interpretations that favored including HIV as a disability under the
Rehabilitation Act.82 The legislative history of the ADA suggests
that its interpretation should mirror Rehabilitation Act precedent,8 3
and Congress has expressly required that interpretation of Title III
be consistent with the earlier statute: "[N]othing in [Title III] shall
be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied
under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 or the regulations
issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such title.' ' Rehabilitation
Act precedent thus sets a floor for the protections afforded by Title
III of the ADA.
With the explosion of AIDS and HIV infection in the 1980s,
questions arose about whether the anti-discrimination provisions of
the Rehabilitation Act were available to HIV-infected individuals.
The DOJ, the agency in charge of implementing the Rehabilitation
Act,85 thus began to receive inquiries about the applicability of the
statute to individuals with HIV. In an opinion issued in 1986 (the
"1986 Memorandum"), the Office of the Attorney General
responded to questions raised by the Department of Health and
the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
80. The Court suggested that HIV infection was absent from the Rehabilitation Act
regulations listing representative impairments because HIV had not yet been identified as
the cause of AIDS when the regulations were drafted. See id. at 2203. This explanation,
however, does not seem to account for the absence of AIDS on the representative list.
81. HIV infection is, however, among the conditions discussed in the legislative
history of the ADA. See 1 PERRIT, supra note 5, § 3.2, at 40 (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-
485, pt. 2, at 51 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 333).
82. Congress was aware of the DOJ opinion that HIV infection is protected by the
Rehabilitation Act when it provided that the ADA should not be construed to apply a
lesser standard than § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.103 (1998); see
also Wendy E. Parmet & Daniel J. Jackson, No Longer Disabled.- The Legal Impact of the
New Social Construction of HIV, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 22 (1997) (suggesting that the
consensus within Congress that HIV would be covered under the ADA might explain the
legislative silence). But see Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., N.A., 123 F.3d 156, 168-
69 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (stating that legislative history is not to be consulted when the
congressional purpose is evident in the "unambiguous" statutory language, the "plain
meaning" of which suggests that HIV infection is not protected).
83. See 1 PERRrT, supra note 5, § 1.2, at 4.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1994) (citation omitted).
85. See Exec. Order No. 12,250, 3 C.F.R. 298 (1981), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1
(1994).
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Human Services concerning the application of § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act to individuals who have, or are regarded as
having, AIDS.86 The Assistant Attorney General drew the following
conclusion: "[S]ection 504 prohibits discrimination based on the
disabling effects that AIDS and related conditions may have on their
victims. By contrast, we have concluded that an individual's (real or
perceived) ability to transmit the disease to others is not a handicap
within the meaning of the statute." 7 Thus, HIV-infected individuals
could be denied services based on their perceived contagiousness,
even when there was no reasonable basis for that perception.8 The
Assistant Attorney General reasoned that although persons suffering
from AIDS have a physical impairment that substantially limits the
major life activity of resisting diseases, a "separate analysis" was
required to determine if the communicability of the disease also
constituted a handicap.8 9  The Assistant Attorney General
hypothesized that an "immune carrier" of AIDS with no physical
impairment or substantial limitations would not have a handicap
based solely on the communicability of his disease; therefore, an
individual who is in fact impaired and limited by the disease still is
not protected from discrimination based solely on the contagiousness
of the disease because contagiousness itself is not a handicap.9°
Shortly after the issuance of the 1986 Memorandum, the
Supreme Court handed down a decision that required the DOJ to
rethink its position on discrimination based on the communicability
of HIV.91 Although School Board v. Arline92 involved a plaintiff with
tuberculosis, the decision has influenced the applicability of the
Rehabilitation Act and the ADA to HIV-infected individuals. 93 In
86. See Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Cooper on Application of
Section 504 of Rehabilitation Act to Persons with AIDS, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 122,
at D-1 (June 25,1986), available in WESTLAW, BNA-DLR database.
87. Id.
88. See id.
89. Id.
90. Id. The Assistant Attorney General found "emphatic support" for his reasoning
in the history of strict federal and state regulation of contagious diseases. See id. The
opinion, however, was widely criticized for its flawed legal analysis and its reliance on
inaccurate medical information. See DOJ Issues Ruling Permitting Bias Against AIDS
Carriers to Stop Spread of Disease, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 122, at A-8 (June 25,
1986), available in WESTLAW, BNA-DLR database.
91. See School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
92. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
93. See, e.g., Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439,1446 (9th Cir. 1994) (relying on Arline in
holding that asymptomatic H1V-infected prison inmates were protected under the
Rehabilitation Act); Parmet & Jackson, supra note 82, at 15-16 (discussing the impact of
Arline on the DOJ's position on IV and the ADA).
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Arline, the Court held that a public elementary school teacher with
tuberculosis was handicapped within the meaning of the
Rehabilitation Act.94 In November 1978, after her third relapse of
tuberculosis in two years, Arline was suspended with pay and later
was discharged at the end of the school year.95 She filed suit alleging
violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, but the district court
found that she was not covered under § 504 because Congress did not
intend for contagious diseases to fall under the definition of
"handicapped. ' 96  The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that
contagious diseases are covered by § 504.97
The Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's decision.98
The Court determined that Arline met the statutory requirement of
physical impairment because her hospitalization for tuberculosis was
sufficient to establish a "record of ... impairment."99  The Court
rejected the school's argument that Arline did not meet the definition
of "handicapped" due to the threat that her relapses posed to others:
"Allowing discrimination based on the contagious effects of a
physical impairment would be inconsistent with the basic purpose of
§ 504, which is to ensure that handicapped individuals are not denied
jobs or other benefits because of the prejudiced attitudes or the
ignorance of others."'" In so ruling, the Court noted that the
legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act demonstrated that
Congress wished to protect individuals from discrimination based on
the feared effects of their impairment on others, as indicated by the
"regarded as" prong of the "handicapped" definition.10' With such an
expansive definition, the Court noted, Congress sought to prevent
94. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 281.
95. See id. at 276.
96. See id. at 277; see also supra note 41 (quoting the § 504 anti-discrimination
provision).
97. See Arline v. School Bd., 772 F.2d 759,764-65 (11th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 480 U.S. 273
(1987).
98. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 277,289.
99. Id. at 281. Like the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act formerly provided that an
individual had a statutory disability if he had "a record of' an impairment that
substantially limited a major life activity. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1994).
100. Arline, 480 U.S. at 284; see also Parmet & Jackson, supra note 82, at 15 (suggesting
that Justice Brennan was surely thinking of HIV when he made this statement and that his
Arline dicta provides guidance for construing the "regarded as" prong of the disability
definition). One of the stated purposes of the Rehabilitation Act is "to empower
individuals with disabilities to maximize employment, economic self-sufficiency,
independence, and inclusion and integration into society" through the statute's various
means. 29 U.S.C.A. § 701(b)(1) (West 1998); see also 29 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1) (1994)
(providing the same purpose).
101. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 284.
1999] 1281
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
discrimination arising from "society's accumulated myths and fears
about disability and disease."'1 2 Thus, the effects of an impairment
on others would not prevent a person from being "handicapped,"
although it might prevent her from being "otherwise qualified 10 3
under the Rehabilitation Act.1°4
In response to the Court's decision in Arline, the DOJ issued an
opinion in 1988 concerning the applicability of § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act to HIV-infected individuals and reached a
different conclusion than it had in the 1986 Memorandum. 5 The
opinion concluded that "section 504 protects symptomatic and
asymptomatic HIV-infected individuals against discrimination in any
covered program or activity on the basis of any actual, past or
perceived effect of HIV infection that substantially limits any major
life activity.' '0 6 Demonstrating the impact of Arline, the DOJ here
required no "separate analysis" for the communicability aspect of the
disease." The DOJ concluded that HIV-infected persons have
physical impairments as defined by the Rehabilitation Act' and that
courts would probably conclude that asymptomatic HIV-infected
102. Id.
103. In an oft-quoted footnote, the Court pointed out that "[a] person who poses a
significant risk of communicating an infectious disease to others in the workplace will not
be otherwise qualified for his or her job if reasonable accommodation will not eliminate
that risk." Id. at 287 n.16. This exception to liability was expressly codified by Congress in
the "direct threat" provision of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (1994); Bragdon,
118 S. Ct. at 2210; see also supra note 37 (discussing the ADA's "direct threat" provision).
Compare Martinez v. School Bd., 861 F.2d 1502, 1506 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that the
lower court's finding of a "remote theoretical possibility" that an HIV-infected child could
transmit the disease to other children was insufficient to constitute the "significant risk"
required to justify segregation of the child under the Rehabilitation Act), with Doe v.
University of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1266 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that despite
the absence of documented surgeon-to-patient transmission, an HIV-infected physician
posed a significant risk to patients and, therefore, was not "otherwise qualified" for
employment under the Rehabilitation Act). The Court suggested that at the "otherwise
qualified" stage of the analysis an individualized inquiry will be required for most cases.
See Arline, 480 U.S. at 287.
104. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 284-86. The Court expressly declined to decide whether
carrying the AIDS virus constitutes a physical impairment and whether an individual with
AIDS is protected by the Rehabilitation Act based solely on her contagiousness. See id. at
282 n.7.
105. See Memorandum for Arthur B. Culvahouse, Jr., Counsel to the President, 12 Op.
Off. Legal Counsel 264 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 Memorandum]. The opinion was issued
in response to a request by Arthur B. Culvahouse, Jr., Counsel to the President, for a
consideration of the applicability of § 504 in light of Arline. See id.
106. Id. at 264-65.
107. See id; see also Parmet & Jackson, supra note 82, at 15-16 (discussing the impact
of Arline on the DOJ's position regarding HIV and the ADA).
108. See 1988 Memorandum, supra note 105, at 270-72.
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individuals have an impairment that substantially limits a major life
activity. 1 9 The 1988 Memorandum identified "procreation and
intimate personal relations" as major life activities that might be
substantially limited by HIV infection,"' but suggested that a plaintiff
would have to prove that he had actually changed his behavior in
response to his infection."' The DOJ proposed, however, that proof
of such change "in fact" would not be required when discrimination
was proven under the "regarded as" prong of the Rehabilitation
Act's handicap definition."2
The DOJ interpretation of the ADA has followed its
interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act in the 1988 Memorandum."3
The ADA regulations promulgated by the DOJ expressly provide
that both symptomatic and asymptomatic HIV meet the
requirements of "physical impairment" for the purposes of the
ADA."4 Although the regulation goes only to the issue of "physical
impairment" and not "disability," the DOJ has elsewhere suggested
that all HIV-infected individuals qualify for protection under the
ADA because they all have a physical impairment that substantially
limits a major life activity." 5 Uncertainty remains, however, because
the promulgated regulations do not address whether asymptomatic
HIV substantially limits a major life activity."6
The same uncertainty existed with the applicability of the
Rehabilitation Act to individuals with HIV infection," 7 but courts
interpreting the Rehabilitation Act avoided these definitional hurdles
by simply ruling that HIV was covered."8 Some of the earliest
109. See id. at 273.
110. I& The Memorandum suggested that individuals with asymptomatic HIV
infection suffer two separate limitations: they are physically unable to bear healthy
children and will be limited in their sexual relations because of that knowledge. See id. at
273-74.
111. See id. at 274. The speculation about a requirement of "actual change" was in
response to the anticipated causation problem if normative judgment and not physical
inability were the actual cause of the substantial limitation. See id.
112. See id.
113. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1998).
114. See id.
115. See DISABILITY RIGHTS SECTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, QUESTIONS AND
ANSWERS: THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND PERSONS WITH HIV/AIDS 2
(1996).
116. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104.
117. The uncertainty was even greater because the Rehabilitation Act regulations do
not specifically identify HIV as a physical impairment. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3 (1998).
118. See, e.g., Martinez v. School Bd., 861 F.2d 1502, 1506 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that
a child with AIDS was protected without providing statutory analysis); Ray v. School
Dist., 666 F. Supp. 1524, 1536 (M.D. Fla. 1987) (concluding that three HIV-positive
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Rehabilitation Act cases to consider the applicability of the statute to
individuals with HIV and AIDS involved schoolchildren who were
denied access to school because of their infection."9 In Thomas v.
Atascadero Unified School District,20 a pre-Arline decision, a district
court in California granted a preliminary injunction enjoining the
school district from preventing Ryan Thomas from attending
kindergarten on the ground that the five-year-old AIDS victim posed
a risk of transmitting the virus.1  Perhaps conflating the
requirements of "physical impairment" and "substantial limitation,"
the court concluded that "[p]ersons infected with the AIDS virus
suffer significant impairments of their major life activities. 12 2
Although Thomas was in the symptomatic stages of the disease, the
court noted that "[e]ven those who are asymptomatic have
abnormalities in their hemic and reproductive systems making
childbirth and procreation dangerous to themselves and others."'"
The court made no individualized inquiry into which of Thomas's
major life activities were substantially limited, but merely stated that
his activities were significantly impaired. 24
In many of the Rehabilitation Act cases following Thomas, the
courts merely assumed that AIDS and HIV infection were handicaps
for purposes of the statute without analysis of the statutory
requirements."l z  In Ray v. School District,26 a case factually parallel
to Thomas, the court granted a preliminary injunction enjoining the
school from preventing three HIV-positive brothers from attending
brothers were protected under the Rehabilitation Act without discussing the statutory
disability definition); see also Parmet & Jackson, supra note 82, at 16-17 (providing an
overview of cases reflecting the judicial assumption that HIV is a disability). Because by
congressional mandate the Rehabilitation Act sets the floor for ADA protections, see 42
U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1994), the Rehabilitation Act cases are necessarily part of the
background to the issues raised in Title III ADA cases.
119. See Ray, 666 F. Supp. at 1528; Thomas v. Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F.
Supp. 376, 380 (C.D. Cal. 1986); see also Parmet & Jackson, supra note 82, at 16
(suggesting that early cases may have avoided close analysis of the statutory requirements
because the plaintiffs were schoolchildren in need of protection).
120. 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
121. Following an incident at school where he bit a classmate, Thomas was excluded
from class and offered home tutoring. See id. at 380-81.
122. Id. at 379.
123. Id. Until he was four years old, Thomas suffered frequent pulmonary and ear
problems and chronic lymphadenopathy. See id. At the time of the court's findings, his
condition had improved, but he was receiving treatments to strengthen his immune system
and to prevent other symptoms from developing. See id.
124. See id.
125. See Parmet & Jackson, supra note 82, at 16-19.
126. 666 F. Supp. 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1987).
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school in an integrated setting.27 A consideration of the likelihood of
the Rays' success on the merits was a prerequisite to issuance of the
preliminary injunction; on this point, the court concluded that success
was indeed likely, apparently assuming without considering the
statutory requirement that the boys be handicapped under the
statute.12 The court presented a lengthy survey of the then-current
medical knowledge about the virus and its medical effects129 and may
have considered this sufficient evidence of handicap; nevertheless,
the statutory requirements for handicap were not even discussed by
the court. The court may have felt that analysis of each requirement
was unnecessary because all three boys were hemophiliacs and thus
were clearly "handicapped.' 130
Once the Supreme Court decided Arline in 1987, lower courts
assumed without analysis that AIDS and HIV were protected under
the Rehabilitation Act and cited Arline as support. 3' These courts
assumed that HIV was a handicap (and later, under the ADA, a
disability) without making any inquiries into whether there was a
substantial limitation of a major life activity.3  In Gates v.
Rowland,33 for example, the Ninth Circuit considered the claim that
prohibiting HIV-infected prison inmates from serving or preparing
food violated the Rehabilitation Act."M The court interpreted Arline
as holding that the contagiousness of a disease becomes the basis for
a finding of disability under the Rehabilitation Act. 35 By reading
127. See id. at 1538. The court's characterization of the disease is a memorable one:
"While we wait for medical science to save us from what many think may be a ... raging,
indiscriminate inferno, it is the task of this Court to deal with the here and now of this
lethal, inevitably fatal disease." Id. at 1529; see also Parmet & Jackson, supra note 82, at
17 (citing the Ray opinion as evidence of the courts' early characterization of AIDS and
HIV as a plague).
128. See Ray, 666 F. Supp. at 1536.
129. See id. at 1528-32.
130. See id. at 1532.
131. See, e.g., Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994) (relying on Arline
for the assumption that the mere contagiousness of HIV is sufficient for recognizing
disability); Doe v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1455, 1459 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Arline in support of
its assertion that "it is well established that infection with AIDS constitutes a handicap for
the purposes of the Act"); Martinez v. School Bd., 861 F.2d 1502, 1506 (11th Cir. 1988)
(citing Arline in support of the assumption that AIDS is protected by the Rehabilitation
Act).
132. See Gates, 39 F.3d at 1446; Garrett, 903 F.2d at 1459; Martinez, 861 F.2d at 1506;
see also Parmet & Jackson, supra note 82, at 22 (noting that early ADA cases followed
Rehabilitation Act precedent, which assumed that HIV was protected).
133. 39 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir. 1994).
134. See id. at 1442, 1444-45.
135. See id. at 1446. The Arline Court determined only that the petitioner was
handicapped under the "record of ... impairment" provision of the handicapped
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Arline to hold that a contagious disease is not only an impairment but
also a disability, courts thus determined without further analysis that
HIV was a disability.136  More recently, courts citing ADA
regulations providing only that HIV is a physical impairment have
erroneously equated "impairment" with "disability" under the
statute instead of recognizing that impairment is but one prong of the
disability definition. 37 As recently as 1996, the Eleventh Circuit in
Gonzales v. Garner Food Services, Inc.138 interpreted the ADA
regulations defining "impairment" to provide that HIV is a
"disability" under the ADA.1 39
For a time, then, courts ignored the requirements of the
statutory disability definition and simply assumed that HIV infection
was protected under both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.
Although this precedent suggested that HIV and AIDS were per se
disabilities under the ADA, courts began to take notice of the
statutory language and to struggle with the applicability of the
antidiscriminatory provisions to individuals with asymptomatic HIV
infectionY.40 When courts began to apply the three-step analysis that
the statutory definition seems to mandate, a split developed among
courts, and there was no longer unanimity among courts considering
definition, noting that her hospitalization for tuberculosis was sufficient to show a record
of impairment that substantially limited a major life activity. See School Bd. v. Arline, 480
U.S. 273, 281 (1987) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B)(ii) (1994)). The rest of the Court's
analysis considered whether the contagiousness of her tuberculosis prevented her from
being handicapped when she otherwise met the statutory definition. See id. at 282-86.
Although the Arline Court declined to decide whether § 504 covers AIDS or HIV
infection, see id. at 282 n.7, the effect of its holding is that an individual with HIV is not
prevented from coverage simply because of the communicability of the disease, see id. at
285-86.
136. See Gates, 39 F.3d at 1446; see also Garrett, 903 F.2d at 1459 (noting that it is "well
established" that AIDS infection constitutes a handicap under the Rehabilitation Act);
Martinez, 861 F.2d at 1506 (affirming without analysis that a child's AIDS was a handicap
under the Rehabilitation Act); Chalk v. U.S. Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701, 706-09 (9th Cir.
1988) (reviewing the physical effects of AIDS but doing no "major life activity" analysis).
137. See, e.g., Gates, 39 F.3d at 1446 (concluding that an HIV-positive individual was
protected under the ADA based on the regulation identifying -IV as a physical
impairment); United States v. Morvant, 898 F. Supp. 1157, 1161 (E.D. La. 1995) (asserting
that HIV infection is a disability under the DOJ regulations); D.B. v. Bloom, 896 F. Supp.
166, 170 n.4 (D.N.J. 1995) (citing a DOJ regulation providing that HIV disease is a
physical impairment in support of an assertion that an asymptomatic plaintiff had a
disability).
138. 89 F.3d 1523 (11th Cir. 1996).
139. See id. at 1526 n.8 (citing 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.104(1)(ii), 36.104(1)(iii) (1995), which
provide only that HIV is a "physical impairment").
140. See, e.g., Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston Store, 924 F. Supp. 763, 774-75, 777
(E.D. Tex. 1996) (concluding that AIDS is a per se disability and suggesting that although
the court believed HIV to be a per se disability, the law is unclear).
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whether asymptomatic HIV was protected.141
The Fourth Circuit on two occasions considered the applicability
of the ADA to asymptomatic HIV and concluded that HIV-infected
plaintiffs were not protected.'42 In Ennis v. National Association of
Business & Educational Radio,143 the plaintiff brought suit under
Title I of the ADA against her former employer, alleging that she
was terminated because the employer wanted to avoid the impact
that her HIV-positive son would have on the company's health
insurance rates. 44 Reviewing the district court's finding that the
plaintiff had established a prima facie case for discrimination, the
Fourth Circuit stated that the "plain language" of the ADA requires
that disability be determined on an "individual-by-individual"
basis. 4  The plain language cited by the court included the phrase
"with respect to an individual" and the requirement that the
impairment substantially limit a major life activity "of such
individual.' 1 46 Because the court identified no evidence that the child
was impaired or that any of his major life activities were substantially
limited, it concluded that the plaintiff was protected from
discrimination only if HIV infection were a per se disability, a
conclusion prohibited by the requirement of a case-by-case
determination.'47
The Fourth Circuit relied on its analysis in Ennis when it again
141. Compare Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310, 1321 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
(concluding that asymptomatic HIV is a physical impairment that substantially limits the
major life activity of reproduction), with Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., N.A., 123
F.3d 156, 168, 172 (4th Cir. 1997) (en bane) (concluding that asymptomatic BHV infection
is not a physical impairment and that it does not substantially limit reproduction).
142. See Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 168, 175; Ennis v. National Ass'n of Bus. & Educ.
Radio, 53 F.3d 55, 60 (4th Cir. 1995).
143. 53 F.3d 55 (4th Cir. 1995).
144. See id. at 57. Discrimination under the ADA includes "excluding or otherwise
denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual because of the known disability of
an individual with whom the qualified individual is known to have a relationship or
association." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4) (1994).
145. Ennis, 53 F.3d at 59. Judge Luttig wrote the opinion, in which Judge Hamilton
and Senior Judge Butzner joined. See id. at 56. Professor Parmet and Mr. Jackson suggest
that the Ennis court was the first court that expressly required an individualized
assessment of disability for an asymptomatic HIV plaintiff. See Parmet & Jackson, supra
note 82, at 32-33.
146. Ennis, 53 F.3d at 59 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994)).
147. See id. at 60. Because the record at the summary judgment stage had not been
fully developed with regard to substantial limitations, the court went on to assume for the
purposes of the case that the plaintiff's child was disabled. See id. Even with the
assumption of disability, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court had erred in finding
that the plaintiff had proven the necessary element that at the time of termination she was
performing at a level that satisfied her employer's expectations. See id. at 61.
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considered the applicability of the ADA to HIV infection in
Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Maryland, N.A. 4 The plaintiff, who
worked in a sales position in the trust department of NationsBank,
alleged that his employer fired him because of his HIV-positive
status.149  The district court granted summary judgment for
NationsBank, holding that the plaintiff had failed to establish a prima
facie case. 50 A Fourth Circuit panel reversed the district court's
decision,' 5 ' but that reversal was set aside by an en banc decision that
affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment. 2  The
initial issue before the court was whether the plaintiff was an
individual with a disability under the ADA.153 Although the EEOC
argued as amicus curiae that asymptomatic HIV infection is a per se
disability, 54 the Fourth Circuit affirmed en banc its holding in Ennis
that a finding of disability under the ADA requires an individualized
inquiry. 55 It qualified this holding, however, by noting that some
impairments, such as blindness and deafness, always substantially
limit major life activities and thus require no individualized
analysis. 6
Turning to the initial requirement of physical impairment, the
court looked to the dictionary for direction on the meaning of
"impairment" and concluded that it contemplates a "diminishing
effect."' 57 It followed, the court reasoned, that asymptomatic HIV
cannot be an impairment because in the absence of symptoms, no
diminishing effects exist.5 8 In so ruling, the court expressly rejected
the decisions of other circuits holding that asymptomatic HIV is an
148. 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
149. See id. at 161.
150. See id. at 163.
151. See Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., N.A., 95 F.3d 1285, 1297 (4th Cir. 1996).
152. See Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 176. Judge Williams wrote the opinion. See id. at
161. Judge Hamilton wrote a concurring opinion. See id. (Hamilton, J., concurring).
Judge Michael wrote a dissenting opinion in which Judges Hall, Murnaghan, Ervin, and
Motz joined. See id. (Michael, J., dissenting).
153. See id. at 165.
154. See id. at 165-66.
155. See id. at 166.
156. See id. at 166 n.5.
157. Id. at 168. Interestingly, the court did not allow agency interpretations of
"impairment" to inform its understanding of that word. The dissent argued that the court
ignored "a wealth of legislative history and administrative interpretation contradictory to
its reading." Id. at 176 (Michael, J., dissenting).
158. See id. at 168. The court rejected the dissent's argument that attacks on the
immune system that occur during the asymptomatic stage could be considered diminishing
effects, warning that such a general definition of impairment would mean that otherwise
healthy individuals with genetic markers for certain diseases would be protected under the
statute. See id. at 168 n.6.
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impairment, suggesting that those courts had ignored the "plain and
unambiguous" meaning of the statute.'59 The court seemed to assert
that asymptomatic IV is per se not a disability, but it then
considered the plaintiff's particular case and concluded that he had
not asserted or produced any evidence of impairment. 60
Although the court concluded that an essential element for a
finding of disability was missing, it nonetheless considered whether
asymptomatic HIV substantially limits a major life activity.16' As it
did with "impairment," rather than looking to agency interpretation
or legislative history, the court turned to the dictionary meaning of
"major," noting that the word means that which is of greater relative
importance. Declining to decide whether procreation is a major
life activity,163 the court held that asymptomatic HIV does not
substantially limit procreation or sexual activity as required by the
ADA because the disease does not actually prevent either activity. 64
Limitation based on choice, the court noted, lacks the causal nexus
between impairment and limitation that is required by the statute. 65
As with the impairment analysis, the court seemed to suggest that
asymptomatic HIV infection can never substantially limit
procreation, but it also made an individualized inquiry, identifying no
evidence in the record that the plaintiff's procreation or sexual
activity were limited by his HIV-positive status.66  The dissent
warned that the court's ruling created a per se rule that individuals
with asymptomatic HIV are not protected by the ADA and that such
159. See id. at 168 (rejecting the analyses of the First Circuit in Abbott v. Bragdon, 107
F.3d 934 (1st Cir.), cert granted in part, 118 S. Ct. 554 (1997), and vacated, 118 S. Ct. 2196
(1998), and the Ninth Circuit in Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir. 1994)).
160. See id. at 169. The dissent suggested that the majority's analysis rejected an
individualized inquiry "in substance if not in form." Id. at 176 (Michael, J., dissenting).
161. See id. at 170. The court noted that the determination of whether an activity is a
"major life activity" does not require an individualized analysis. See id.
162. See id.
163. The court stated, "We agree that procreation is a fundamental human activity, but
are not certain that it is one of the major life activities contemplated by the ADA." Id. at
170. It then assumed for the purposes of its analysis that procreation and sexual relations
were major life activities. See id. at 171.
164. See id. at 172. Implicit in the majority's analysis is the notion that procreation
means having children, as opposed to having healthy children because HIV infection
physically limits the ability to procreate healthy children.
165. See id.
166. See id. The court also rejected the plaintiff's claim that he was disabled because
his employers regarded him as disabled, noting that the plaintiff had failed to produce
evidence that his employers regarded his H1V as substantially limiting any major life
activities. See id. at 174. The court noted that the bank did not know of the plaintiff's
HIV infection when it decided to terminate him, although the bank admitted to knowledge
of the infection by the time the plaintiff was actually terminated. See id.
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a decision moved the Fourth Circuit away from the mainstream. 67
Other courts required the three-step analysis but, in contrast to
the Fourth Circuit, concluded that asymptomatic HIV is protected by
the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. For example, Doe v. Kohn
Nast & Graf, P.C."6 was one of the early cases in which a court
engaged in the three-step process of determining the applicability of
the ADA to asymptomatic HIV infection. 169  An HI V-infected
attorney alleged that he was fired in violation of Title I of the ADA
because of his HIV status. 70 The plaintiff asserted that the
irreparable impairment of his ability to reproduce was a substantial
limitation of a major life activity.' 71 The defendants challenged the
discrimination claim on the ground that the plaintiff was not
disabled. 72 The court concluded that the plaintiff's skin disorders
and hemic and lymphatic disorders each qualified as a physical
impairment.73 It then accepted the plaintiff's argument that because
the ADA regulations define "physical impairment" to include
disorders of the reproductive system, it followed that the ability to
reproduce is a major life activity under the ADA. 4 Concluding that
167. See id. at 176 (Michael, J., dissenting); see also Elizabeth C. Chambers, Comment,
Asymptomatic HIV as a Disability Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 73 WASH. L.
REv. 403, 416-18 (1998) (discussing the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in the Ennis and
Runnebaum decisions); Recent Case, 111 HARV. L. REV. 843, 848 (1998) (asserting that
the Runnebaum decision resulted in the rule that asymptomatic HIV is per se not a
disability).
168. 862 F. Supp. 1310 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
169. See Parmet & Jackson, supra note 82, at 29.
170. See Kohn Nast & Graf, 862 F. Supp. at 1313. The plaintiff had received a letter
from a physician written on letterhead labeled "AIDS Services," and staff at his office had
speculated aloud whether the plaintiff suffered from AIDS. See id. at 1314. Days after he
received the letter, the plaintiff alleged that his boss's behavior towards him changed. See
id. at 1315. The plaintiff's contract was not renewed based on unsatisfactory performance,
and he was ultimately forced out of the office. See id. The plaintiff allegedly returned to
work after an out-of-town trip to find his office lock changed and his belongings in boxes.
See id.
171. See id. at 1318. The plaintiff's Title I ADA claim was based on a pretext theory,
which required a showing that despite his employer's advanced legitimate reasons for
termination, his disability in fact played some role in the decision to terminate. See id.
172- See id. The defendant argued that the plaintiff could not be disabled because he
was able to do everything that his occupation required of him. See id. In response to the
plaintiff's argument that he was substantially limited in the major life activity of
reproduction, the defendant responded that this concern was irrelevant because he was
not hired to reproduce. See id. Even assuming that the plaintiff did fall into the protected
class of individuals with disabilities, the defendant argued that there was no discrimination
because he was fired for the legitimate reason of being a disruptive employee. See id. at
1317-18.
173. See id. at 1320.
174. See id. at 1321; see also 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1998) (defining "physical impairment"
to include disorders of the reproductive system).
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nothing in the record countered the plaintiff's argument, the court
held that the plaintiff had a physical impairment that substantially
limited a major life activity as contemplated by the ADA.175
Other courts have determined that reproduction is not a major
life activity for the purposes of the ADA, although not in the HIV
context. 76 In an unreported opinion, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
district court's finding in Zatarain v. WDS U-Television, Inc.177 that
reproduction is not a major life activity under the ADA.178 The
impairment at issue in Zatarain was not HIV but infertility; the
plaintiff was a television news anchor who requested modifications in
her work schedule in order to accommodate infertility treatments. 79
When the station failed to provide those accommodations and did
not renew her contract, the plaintiff filed discrimination claims under
the ADA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.180 The
television station sought summary judgment on the ADA claim on
the ground that infertility is not a disability.181 Although the district
court found that infertility could be a physical impairment, it granted
summary judgment because the plaintiff's infertility did not
substantially limit a major life activity. 82
The district court rejected the plaintiff's claim that reproduction
is a major life activity on two grounds. First, the court noted the
circular reasoning that an impairment on reproduction significantly
limits the major life activity of reproduction: "Plaintiff's construction
is faulty because it would allow her to bootstrap a finding of
substantial limitation of a major life activity on to a finding of an
impairment."'8 Second, the court found an inconsistency between
reproduction and the major life activities identified in the ADA
regulations because reproduction does not occur with the same
frequency as activities like walking, breathing, and seeing. 84 Thus,
the court focused on the quantitative, rather than the qualitative,
175. See Kohn Nast & Graf, 862 F. Supp. at 1321.
176. See Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996); Zatarain v.
WDSU-Television, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240 (E.D. La. 1995), affd, 79 F.3d 1143 (5th Cir.
1996) (unpublished table decision).
177. 881 F. Supp. 240 (E.D. La. 1995), aff'd, 79 F.3d 1143 (5th Cir. 1996) (unpublished
table decision).
178. See Zatarain, 79 F.3d at 1143.
179. See Zatarain, 881 F. Supp. at 242.
180. See id. Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of an
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
181. See Zatarain, 881 F. Supp. at 242.
182- See id. at 243-44.
183. Id. at 243.
184. See id.
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characteristics of the representative activities. 15
Asymptomatic HIV has also been protected under the
Rehabilitation Act provision protecting perceived disability.1 86 In
Harris v. Thigpen,"87 the Eleventh Circuit held that HIV-positive
inmates in an Alabama prison were protected under the "regarded
as" prong of the Rehabilitation Act's "handicap" definition.188  In
accordance with Alabama law, the Alabama Department of
Corrections required that inmates be tested for sexually transmitted
diseases. 8 9 If the inmate tested positive for HIV on the initial test
and on confirmatory tests, the inmate was placed in a segregated HIV
ward. 9 The plaintiffs in Harris were segregated, HIV-positive
inmates who argued that the blanket segregation of HIV-infected
inmates violated the Rehabilitation Act.'9' The district court denied
the injunctive relief sought by the plaintiffs,'9 but on appeal the
Eleventh Circuit remanded the Rehabilitation Act claim for further
inquiry into the risk posed by integration of HIV-positive inmates. 93
The Eleventh Circuit noted that Harris presented the very issue
expressly avoided by the Arline Court-whether discrimination
against HIV-infected individuals solely on the basis of the
contagiousness of their disease violates the Rehabilitation Act. 94
185. Following the Zatarain reasoning, the Eighth Circuit similarly rejected an infertile
woman's argument that reproduction is a major life activity. See Krauel v. Iowa Methodist
Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 677 (8th Cir. 1996). But see Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F.
Supp. 1393, 1405 (N.D. 11. 1994) (concluding that a woman's claim that her infertility
substantially limited the major life activity of reproduction was sufficient under the
ADA). For a discussion of Zatarain and Krauel and a survey of both HIV and infertility
cases in which courts have considered whether reproduction constitutes a major life
activity, see Heidi R. Youngs, Reproduction as a Major Life Activity Under the ADA: A
Survey of the Law Beginning with the Eighth Circuit, 31 CREIGO-rroN L. REV. 455, 456-57,
466-67 (1998). Ms. Youngs concludes that the remedial purpose of the ADA suggests that
reproduction should be interpreted as a major life activity. See id. at 474.
186. See 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B)(iii) (1994).
187. 941 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1991), appeal after remand sub nom. Onishea v. Hopper,
126 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 1997), reh'g en banc granted and vacated, 133 F.3d 1377 (11th Cir.
1998).
188. See id. at 1524.
189. See id. at 1499. Alabama law provided that prisoners sentenced to 30 or more
days must be tested upon their entrance to the correctional facility for sexually
transmitted diseases, as designated by the state board of health. See id. at 1499 n.2 (citing
ALA. CODE § 22-11A-17(a) (1990)).
190. See id- at 1499-500.
191. See id. at 1500. The inmates also argued that the segregation violated their
constitutionally protected privacy rights. See id.
192. See id. at 1501.
193. See id. at 1527.
194. See id. at 1523; see also supra notes 91-104 and accompanying text (discussing the
Arline Court's holding that an individual's contagiousness will not prevent the individual
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The court avoided the "physical impairment" and "major life
activities" analysis required for a finding of handicap by determining
that the inmates were handicapped under the "regarded as" prong of
the definition: "Whether or not asymptomatic HIV infection alone is
defined as an actual 'physical impairment,' it is clear that this
correctional system treats the inmates such that they are unable, or
perceived as unable, to engage in 'major life activities' relative to the
rest of the prison population."'195 The court held that such treatment
meant that the inmates were handicapped even if the treatment were
justifiable.196
The Supreme Court's decision in Bragdon has significant
implications for the applicability of the ADA to individuals with
asymptomatic HIV and for the interpretation of the ADA in general.
First, with Bragdon the Court has now mandated close scrutiny of the
ADA disability definition, and with its holding that HIV infection
substantially limited Abbott's reproduction, the Court pursued an
individualized inquiry, a move that is consistent with both the letter
and spirit of the ADA.'9 Second, the Court intimated that the
reproduction argument might be expanded to include economic or
legal limitations on reproduction incurred by asymptomatic HIV-
infected plaintiffs who do procreate.98 Finally, by relying on an
actual disability as the basis for its statutory analysis, the Court
signaled that asymptomatic HIV infection is a present disability
deserving protection and avoided the circularity inherent in holding
Abbott disabled under the "regarded as" provision of the statute. 9
At the first step of the statutory analysis, the Court made a per
se holding that HIV is a physical impairment under the ADA from
the moment of infection.2" The Court's lengthy analysis on this issue
from being protected under the Rehabilitation Act).
195. Harris, 941 F.2d at 1524.
196. See id. On remand the district court ruled for the prison, but on appeal a panel of
the Eleventh Circuit vacated the decision and ordered a reassignment of the case on
remand. See Onishea v. Hopper, 126 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 1997). The Eleventh Circuit
vacated the district court's decision because the district court failed to comply with
Harris's mandate that the plaintiffs did not have to prove complete elimination of risk in
order to be considered "otherwise qualified" under the Rehabilitation Act. See id. at
1331-32. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the panel opinion and granted a rehearing en banc.
See iL at 1323. For a pre-Harris consideration of the applicability of § 504 to segregated
HiV-positive inmates, see Ayesha Khan, The Application of Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act to the Segregation of HIV-Positive Inmates, 65 WASH. L. REV. 839
(1990).
197. See infra notes 200-35 and accompanying text.
198. See infra notes 236-42 and accompanying text.
199. See infra notes 243-67 and accompanying text.
200. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2204.
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traced the "predictable" course of HIV infection and the medical
effects at each stage of the disease.20 1 Nothing about the analysis at
this stage related to the effects of HIV infection on Abbott; rather, it
was a scientific overview of the stages of HIV infection.2 2  The
holding also did not reference the plaintiff's impairment: "In light of
the immediacy with which the virus begins to damage the infected
person's white blood cells and the severity of the disease, we hold
[HIV] is an impairment from the moment of infection. '23  The
Court's per se holding as to whether a disease constitutes a physical
impairment is consistent with agency interpretations of the ADA.204
By including a representative list of conditions and disorders that
qualify as impairments in its regulations implementing the Act, the
DOJ had indicated its understanding that an individualized inquiry is
not required at this stage of the analysis.205 Thus, under Bragdon,
courts need no longer engage in an individualized inquiry of the
impairment of an asymptomatic HIV-infected plaintiff.2 6
Next, the Court considered whether reproduction was a major
life activity and again made a per se holding.2°  In holding that
reproduction qualifies as a major life activity as contemplated by the
201. See id. at 2203.
202- See id.; see also supra notes 2,46 (describing the three stages of HIV disease).
203. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2204. The significance of this holding extends beyond HIV
infection to other conditions that have asymptomatic phases or that are asymptomatic
when treated properly. See, e.g., Cehrs v. Northeast Ohio Alzheimer's Research Ctr., 155
F.3d 775, 780 (6th Cir. 1998) (relying on Bragdon for the assertion that the plaintiff's life-
threatening psoriasis was a physical impairment even in the dormant stages of the disease);
Erjavac v. Holy Family Health Plus, 13 F. Supp. 2d 737, 743 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (considering
whether diabetes managed by insulin can constitute an ADA disability and noting that
Bragdon makes it "clear that a disease need not produce continuous, identifiable (to the
casual observer) symptoms in order to constitute an impairment").
204. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1998); see also supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text
(discussing agency interpretation of the ADA).
205. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104.
206. Bragdon thus corrects the Fourth Circuit's requirement that an asymptomatic
HIV plaintiff provide evidence of actual impairment. See Runnebaum v. NationsBank of
Md., N.A., 123 F.3d 156, 169 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Prior to Bragdon, even courts
determining that asymptomatic HIV was a physical impairment focused on the plaintiff's
actual impairment. See, e.g., Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310, 1320
(E.D. Pa. 1994) (concluding that the plaintiffs skin disorders and swollen lymph nodes
qualified as impairments).
207. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2204-05. Although the Bragdon Court held that
reproduction is a major life activity under the ADA, plaintiffs will not always be able to
demonstrate that their impairments substantially limit reproduction. See, e.g., McGraw v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1021 (D. Minn. 1998) (rejecting a menopausal
woman's argument that under Bragdon she was disabled because of her inability to
procreate, noting that menopause is a "normal consequence of human aging").
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ADA, the Court emphasized the qualitative aspects of "major. '20 8
The Court was not concerned with whether reproduction was a major
life activity for the plaintiff, but rather the Court focused on its
general significance and its consistency with the representative list of
major life activities identified in the regulations, such as walking,
breathing, and working." 9
Only at the third and final step in the statutory analysis, the
"substantially limits" inquiry, did the Court consider Abbott's
particular situation.210  The language of the opinion at this point
turned from a general evaluation of the physical effects of HIV and
the importance of reproduction to an analysis of the actual effects
that Abbott's HIV infection had on her reproduction: "Our
evaluation of the medical evidence leads us to conclude that
respondent's infection substantially limited her ability to reproduce
.... 11 The Court examined the ways in which an HIV-infected
woman is limited in her ability to reproduce.1 2 Although this inquiry
was not individualized because it focused on statistical evidence
concerning the risk of perinatal transmission of the virus, the
208, See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2205 (noting that reproduction and sexual activity are
"central to the life process itself"). Prior to Bragdon, some courts holding that
reproduction is not a major life activity focused on the quantitative character of "major"
and emphasized the non-daily nature of reproduction. See, e.g., Zatarain v. WSDU-
Television, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240, 243 (E.D. La. 1995) (distinguishing reproduction from
the representative activities because "a person is not called upon to reproduce throughout
the day, every day"), aff'd, 79 F.3d 1143 (5th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision); see
also Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2215 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (arguing that the definition of major as "greater in quantity" is most
consistent with the activities included in the ADA's illustrative list).
209. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2205 (citing Rehabilitation Act regulations, 28 C.F.R.
§ 41.31(b)(2) (1997); 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1997)). Even the Runnebaum court-
which required an individualized inquiry into whether a condition was a physical
impairment-acknowledged that the determination of whether an activity is a major life
activity does not require individualized inquiry. See Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 170. Chief
Justice Rehnquist, however, would require an individualized inquiry even at this stage in
the analysis. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2214 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part). He was not satisfied by Abbott's assertion that after
learning of her HIV infection she decided not to have children. See id. at 2215 (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Assuming only for the
sake of argument that reproduction was a major life activity, he noted the absence of
evidence demonstrating that reproduction was a part of Abbott's life prior to her infection
or that she would have had children if not for the infection. See id. at 2214-15 (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Thus, there was no
evidence that reproduction was a major life activity to her. See id at 2215 (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
210. See Bragdon, 118 S.'Ct. at 2206-07.
211. Id. at 2206 (emphasis added).
212. See id.
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evidence suggested the reasonableness of Abbott's perception that
her ability to reproduce was limited by her H-IV infection.213 The
Court then returned to the actual effect that Abbott's HIV had on
her reproductive abilities, pointing out that she had produced
unchallenged testimony that her decision not to reproduce was based
on her HIV infection.214
In accordance with the Bragdon decision, other courts must
follow the three-step framework in determining whether a plaintiff
has a statutory disability. 215 Although the Court did not expressly
mandate an individualized inquiry at the "substantially limits" stage
in the disability analysis, its individualized analysis of Abbott's
limited reproduction and its refusal to make a per se holding suggest
that courts should engage in an individualized inquiry at the third
step in the analysis.1 6 It would have been difficult for the Court to
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. See id. at 2202 (describing the analysis of Abbott's disability status as a three-step
process). Courts are using the Bragdon Court's three-step analysis in ADA cases
involving various disabilities. See, e.g., Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Dep't, 158 F.3d
635 (2d Cir. 1998) (cardiovascular and musculoskeletal impairments); Cehrs v. Northeast
Ohio Alzheimer's Research Ctr., 155 F.3d 775 (6th Cir. 1998) (psoriasis); Erjavac v. Holy
Family Health Plus, 13 F. Supp. 2d 737 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (diabetes).
216. There is no consensus about the implications of Bragdon with regard to the need
for individualized inquiry in cases involving plaintiffs with asymptomatic HIV infection.
Compare Deas v. River West, L.P., 152 F.3d 471, 478 n.15 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating that
Bragdon was not a per se holding), and Gabriel v. City of Chicago, 9 F. Supp. 2d 974, 978
(N.D. Ill. 1998) (noting that the Court in Bragdon held that the plaintiffs HIV constituted
a disability), with Rivera v. Heyman, 157 F.3d 101, 103 (2d Cir. 1998) (interpreting
Bragdon to hold that HIV infection is always a disability), and Doe v. Dekalb County Sch.
Dist., 145 F.3d 1441, 1445 n.5 (11th Cir. 1998) (stating that the Court in Bragdon held that
asymptomatic HIV is a disability).
Professor Parmet and Mr. Jackson argue that the unwillingness of today's courts to
assume that the ADA protects persons with asymptomatic HIV may reflect the changing
"social construction" of HIV and AIDS as a result of new medical developments. See
Parmet & Jackson, supra note 82, at 7-8. They describe the "initial social construction" of
HIV as that of a plague, noting that shortly after the disease's discovery it was commonly
identified as the "gay plague." Id. at 9. Because of the social hysteria about the disease, a
legal framework developed to remedy discrimination against the HIV-infected. See id. at
10-11. This "framework" was provided by federal disability law, see id. at 11-14, and
because of the need to provide guaranteed protection to the victims of social hysteria, in
decisions like Ray and Thomas, the courts avoided close scrutiny of whether HIV
infection substantially limited a major life activity, see id. at 16; see also supra notes 117-30
and accompanying text (surveying ADA and Rehabilitation Act decisions that held HIV-
infected plaintiffs to be within the protected class without engaging in analysis of the
statutory requirements).
Professor Parmet and Mr. Jackson also argue that the country is now involved in a
"second construction" of HIV inspired by the medical developments in the management
of the HIV virus. See Parmet & Jackson, supra note 82, at 27-28. In July 1996, the
positive results of the antiviral drugs called protease inhibitors were announced at the
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reconcile a holding that asymptomatic HIV is a per se disability with
the language of the ADA, which suggests that an individualized
inquiry is required. 17 Indeed, the statutory requirement that an
individual's impairment substantially limits a major life activity "of
such individual" seems to mandate an individualized inquiry.218
While the statutory language-and now the Supreme Court-
seem to mandate a fact-specific inquiry to determine whether a
plaintiff has a disability, a question remains whether such an
approach actually advances the ADA's purpose of preventing
discrimination based on disability.2 9 Certainly the individualized
inquiry places some burden on plaintiffs to prove actual limitation,
AIDS Conference in Vancouver, but the changing attitude towards the disease began even
earlier as drugs like AZT were shown to be effective against HIV in the late 1980s and
early 1990s. See id. Additionally, as the numbers of intravenous drug users and
homosexual people contracting the disease increased, those suffering from the disease
were more frequently characterized not as innocent victims, but rather as those who
deserved infection. See id. at 29. The result, Professor Parmet and Mr. Jackson claim, was
that "[b]y the early 1990s, one could begin to say that the era of the innocent victim, who
like the traditionally disabled person, was afflicted not due to any of his or her own
actions, had ended." Id.
While the individual assessment required by the ADA definition may have initially
afforded protection to the non-traditional disability of AIDS, it now puts the burden on
each asymptomatic HIV plaintiff to prove that her impairment substantially limits a major
life activity. See id. at 22-26 (arguing that the "plasticity" of the ADA disability definition,
which first offered HIV protection under the law, now makes protection more problematic
as we move away from the social construction of AIDS as a plague); see also Catherine J.
Lanctot, Ad Hoc Decision Making and Per Se Prejudice: How Individualizing the
Determination of "Disability" Undermines the ADA, 42 VILL. L. REV. 327, 332 (1997)
(arguing that the case-by-case approach requires each ADA case to be considered in a
vacuum).
217. Although the Court did not reach the issue, much of Abbott's brief was devoted to
the argument that the legislative history of the ADA demonstrates that Congress intended
HIV to be a per se disability under the statute. See Brief for the Respondent Sidney
Abbott, Bragdon (No. 97-156), available in 1998 WL 47514, at *32-35 (surveying the
House and Senate ADA Reports). The Brief states that Congress was aware of the legal
history of the Rehabilitation Act and HIV and that its inclusion of the same language in
the ADA indicates congressional intent that HIV always be protected under the statute.
See id. at *35-36 (discussing unanimity among courts on the issue of Rehabilitation Act
protection of individuals with disabilities). Nevertheless, the language of the disability
definition and the absence of any mention of HIV in the statute render the legislative
history argument problematic. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
218. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A); see also Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2214 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (identifying this language as the
source of the ADA's individualized inquiry requirement). But see Lanctot, supra note
216, at 329 (arguing that "[s]imple common sense" requires that certain impairments be
considered per se disabilities).
219. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b). Professor Lanctot argues that the refusal to declare
certain impairments disabilities as a matter of law is inconsistent with the goal of
eliminating discrimination: "[P]rejudice by its very nature is not based on ad hoc reactions
to particular individuals." Lanctot, supra note 216, at 337.
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and some plaintiffs who otherwise might be assumed disabled may
not qualify."0 After Bragdon, a young, asymptomatic HIV-infected
woman will likely have little difficulty proving actual limitation of the
major life activity of reproduction, but Bragdon does not guarantee
ADA protection for all asymptomatic HIV-infected plaintiffs. Some
have suggested that the ADA requires a presently existing limitation
and therefore, that the reproduction argument would not be available
to children infected with HIV.z1  Homosexual men infected with
HIV will likely have a more difficult time persuading courts that their
procreation was substantially limited by their infection,222 and an
even harder case would be that of HIV-positive, post-menopausal
women who are no longer able to reproduce. 223 Thus, the next
plaintiff for whom the reproduction argument is unavailable will have
to prove that although he suffers no physical symptoms, he
experiences an actual and substantial limitation of a major life
activity. While the Court did not require much in the way of proof of
220. See Lanctot, supra note 216, at 330. As evidence of the "disquieting" effects of
courts' refusal to recognize per se disabilities, Professor Lanctot cites a Fifth Circuit
decision holding that a woman who had a mastectomy and was undergoing radiation failed
to raise a material issue of fact as to whether the cancer and treatment substantially
limited a major life activity. See id. at 329-30 (discussing Ellison v. Software Spectrum,
Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 191 (5th Cir. 1996)).
221. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2216 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that the "limits" language of the statute requires a
present limitation); Chambers, supra note 167, at 419 (warning that the reproduction
argument fails to protect children, post-menopausal women, and celibate monks). But see
Doe v. Dolton Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 148, 694 F. Supp. 440, 445 (N.D. Il1. 1988)
(finding that a twelve-year-old student was substantially limited in the major life activity
of reproduction because "the mere prospect of such a limitation is certain to restrict social
interaction with those of the opposite sex").
222. See Parmet & Jackson, supra note 82, at 35 (noting that homosexual men may
have a difficult time arguing that their infection changed their reproductive plans). It is
not clear whether the Runnebaum court's refusal to recognize that HIV infection
substantially limited reproduction was influenced by the plaintiffs homosexuality. See
Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., N.A., 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc). The
court asserted that there was no evidence that the plaintiff chose not to have children
because of his infection and noted that there was evidence that he had not foregone sexual
relationships, stating that "the record shows that he concealed his HIV infection from his
lover." Id. at 172. The court made this individual inquiry, however, only after it
determined that HIV infection per se does not substantially limit reproduction or sexual
activity, so the court thereby extended its ruling beyond the homosexual plaintiff in
rejecting the reproduction argument. See id.
223. See Chambers, supra note 167, at 419. It is difficult to imagine a successful
showing of actual limitation of reproductive activities by a woman who contracted HIV
infection after menopause. Although heterosexual men cannot directly transmit the virus
perinatally to a child, the possibility of transmission to the mother suggests that the risk of
perinatal transmission argument may be available to heterosexual male plaintiffs.
[Vol. 771298
1999] ADA PROTECTION OF HIV PATIENTS 1299
substantial limitation, 4 individuals in the asymptomatic stages of a
disease may have difficulty identifying any other major life activity
that is at all limited by their disease.
Although these hypothetical plaintiffs may suggest the
desirability of per se disabilities, there are risks associated with
declaring certain impairments disabilities as a matter of law: a per se
holding that HIV is a disability might backfire by opening the door to
per se exclusions of protection for other conditions." Requiring an
individualized assessment promotes Congress's goal of offering
expansive protection against discrimination based on disabilities by
preventing blanket exclusions0 6 The Runnebaum court made such a
blanket exclusion when it in effect (though not explicitly) asserted
that asymptomatic HIV is per se not protected by the ADA.227
The Bragdon Court declared HIV only a per se impairment, but
some courts have already interpreted the decision as declaring HIV a
per se disability.' In Doe v. Dekalb County School District,229 for
224. The Bragdon Court was satisfied by the plaintiff's testimony that her HIV
infection "controlled her decision not to have a child." Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2206. The
Court, therefore, did not inquire into whether Abbott would have had a child if not for the
infection, nor did it look into whether she was otherwise physically capable of having a
child. See id. By not inquiring into Abbott's fertility, the Court avoided the problem
Professor Parmet and Mr. Jackson have identified with the First Circuit's decision in
Abbott that the recognition of disability "was based in large part on the fortuity of
[Abbott's] own fertility." Parmet & Jackson, supra note 82, at 35. Chief Justice
Rehnquist implied that the statutory requirement of individual assessment puts a greater
burden of proof on the plaintiff than was recognized by the majority. See Bragdon, 118 S.
Ct. at 2214-15 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
225. See Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 169, 172. If the Bragdon Court had made no
individual inquiry and had held that asymptomatic HIV is always a disability, courts would
have been free to abandon individual inquiry and declare that certain disabilities are never
covered. Professor Parmet and Mr. Jackson argue that at the "core" of disability law is
the notion that "no one can prepare a list of disabling conditions, because an impairment
that affects one individual minimally may well affect another individual significantly."
Parmet & Jackson, supra note 82, at 23; see also 1 PERRrTr, supra note 5, § 3.2, at 40
(discussing Congress's reasons for not including a comprehensive list of conditions
constituting disabilities).
226. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994) (listing one of the ADA's purposes as
providing "a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities").
227. See Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 169, 172; see also Lanctot, supra note 216, at 337
(implying that the effect of Runnebaum was to exclude per se asymptomatic HIV
individuals from ADA protection); Recent Case, supra note 167, at 848 (asserting that the
Runnebaum decision resulted in the rule that asymptomatic HIV is per se not a disability).
228. See Rivera v. Heyman, 157 F.3d 101, 103 (2d Cir. 1998); Doe v. Dekalb County
Sch. Dist., 145 F.3d 1441, 1445 n.5 (11th Cir. 1998). But see Deas v. River West, L.P., 152
F.3d 471, 478 n.15 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating that Bragdon was not a per se holding); Gabriel
v. City of Chicago, 9 F. Supp. 2d 974, 978 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (noting that the Court in
Bragdon held only that the plaintif-fs HIV constituted a disability).
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example, the Eleventh Circuit considered whether an HIV-positive
teacher had an ADA Title I action based on his transfer to a different
classroom.130 The court noted that the first element of a Title I prima
facie case for employment discrimination is that the plaintiff has a
disability. 31 Although the district court's finding that the plaintiff
had met this requirement does not seem to have been challenged on
appeal, in a footnote the Eleventh Circuit observed that under
Bragdon an individual with asymptomatic HIV is "disabled" under
the ADA." Such a reading is inconsistent with the Court's holding
that Abbott's infection limited her ability to reproduce231 and with its
refusal to decide the per se issue on which it also granted certiorari. 4
Other courts have recognized that the Court made an individualized
inquiry into whether Abbott's reproduction was substantially limited
and that the Court expressly declined to make a per se ruling.235
Although Bragdon does not guarantee ADA protection to all
individuals with asymptomatic HIV, the Court's analysis suggests
that the reproductive argument might be available to a larger class of
HIV-infected plaintiffs than previously contemplated by the
decisions of the lower courts236  After stating that HIV-infected
individuals who do choose to reproduce may encounter economic
and legal consequences, the Court noted: "[T]he disability definition
does not turn on personal choice. When significant limitations result
from the impairment, the definition is met even if the difficulties are
229. 145 F.3d 1441 (11th Cir. 1998).
230. See id at 1443. The plaintiff was a special education teacher and was transferred
to a classroom of children with less severe behavioral disorders. See id. at 1443-44. The
transfer was based on the school's fear that HIV might be transmitted if he came into
direct contact with the more violent students in his former classroom. See id.
231. See id. at 1445.
232. See id. at 1445 n.5 (citing Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998)).
233. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2206.
234. See id. at 2207.
235. See Deas v. River West, L.P., 152 F.3d 471, 478 (5th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that
Bragdon was not a per se holding); Ellis v. Mohenis Servs. Inc., No. CIV.A.96-6307, 1998
WL 564478, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 1998) (mem.) (same).
236. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2206. Other courts have accepted the argument that
reproduction may be substantially limited only in cases when an HIV-infected individual
elected not to reproduce because of the risk of transmission. See, e.g., Abbott v. Bragdon,
107 F.3d 934, 942 (1st Cir.) (suggesting that the basis for determining a substantial
limitation is the fact that an eight percent risk of transmission to a child will deter HIV-
infected women from procreating), cert. granted in part, 118 S. Ct. 554 (1997), and vacated,
118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998); Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310, 1321 (E.D. Pa.
1994) (implying that the reproduction argument is available to HIV-infected plaintiffs
because the risk of transmission causes them not to reproduce). The Court in Bragdon
seems to have been the first to suggest that reproduction may be limited even when
reproduction actually occurs.
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not insurmountable."' 7  The Court indicated, however, that the
difficulties in Abbott's case were insurmountable because she had
chosen not to reproduce."
In its intimations that a substantial limitation need not be
physical, the Court's opinion may broaden the availability of the
reproduction argument to plaintiffs who do reproduce but incur
economic or legal limitations as a result." 9 Responding to the Chief
Justice's demand for a less elusive disability definition-one that is
not determined by the personal choice of the infected individualQ-4
the Court's dicta expands the notion of limitation beyond the
physical and thus opens the door to HIV-infected individuals who
bear children and consequently suffer other non-physical
limitations,241 as well as to those who choose not to have children
because of the risk of infection. 42
If the Court had not determined that Abbott had an actual
disability, it might have considered whether she had a disability
under the "regarded as" prong of the statutory definition.2 43 Chief
Justice Rehnquist argued that the Court should not consider whether
237. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2206.
238. See id.
239. See id.
240. Chief Justice Rehnquist quarreled with the idea that choice could constitute the
required limitation and suggested that even if-as the majority suggested-the statute
does not require "utter inabilities," it still requires a showing that the individual is "less
able" to engage in the activity. Id. at 2216 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part). Abbott, he suggested, had made no such showing that she was
less able to reproduce because of her infection. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part). The Chief Justice warned that the Court's
interpretation, if "taken to its logical extreme, would render every individual with a
genetic marker for some debilitating disease 'disabled' here and now because of some
possible future effects." Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part). The Runnebaum majority expressed the same concerns when it
declined to recognize asymptomatic HIV as an impairment for fear that individuals with
genetic markers would also be protected. See Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., N.A.,
123 F.3d 156, 168 n.6 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
241. The non-physical limitations suggested by the Court are the costs of antiretroviral
therapy and long-term health care for an infected child and the legal ramifications in states
that have criminalized sexual intercourse by people infected with HIV. See Bragdon, 118
S. Ct. at 2206. The implications of the Court's reasoning are not limited to HIV-infected
plaintiffs; Bragdon has opened the door for plaintiffs with other impairments to argue that
a non-physical limitation of a major life activity is a basis for disability.
242. See id. at 2205-07. It has even been argued that counseling HIV-infected women
not to reproduce constitutes different and unequal medical treatment inconsistent with the
spirit of the ADA. See Taunya Lovell Banks, The Americans with Disabilities Act and the
Reproductive Rights of HIV-Infected Women, 3 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 57, 88 (1994).
Professor Banks acknowledges, however, that an amendment would be required to make
such conduct clearly prohibited. See id. at 96.
243. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (1994).
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Abbott was "regarded as" having a disability because the First
Circuit declined to consider the argument and the Court rarely
considers arguments not addressed in the lower courts. 44 The Court
only noted that it "need not consider" the other prongs of the
definition because it determined that Abbott was disabled under
subsection (A) of the disability definition.2 45 One commentator has
argued that deciding Bragdon under the "regarded as" prong of the
disability decision would have avoided the limitations inherent in the
reproduction argument.2 46
Under the "regarded as" prong of the disability definition, an
individual is disabled if she is "regarded as having such an
impairment. '24 7 The phrase "having such an impairment" thus cross-
references subsection (A), the actual disability prong of the
definition. 24s  As Chief Justice Rehnquist urged, the statutory
language therefore seems to require the plaintiff to prove not mere
prejudice on the basis of an impairment, but that the defendant
regarded the plaintiff as having an impairment that substantially
limited a major life activity.2 49 A more liberal reading of the
"regarded as" prong would consider an individual disabled if he were
limited in his ability to participate in society because of
discrimination on the grounds of a perceived impairment. 5 0
Although this approach would promote the goal of eliminating
discrimination, it does not seem consistent with the statutory
language requiring that the individual was perceived as having "such
244. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2214 n.1 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part).
245. See id. at 2201; see also supra note 39 (discussing Bragdon's concession at oral
argument that the "regarded as" issue was raised in lower courts).
246. See Chambers, supra note 167, at 403. Ms. Chambers argues that the actual
disability prong will not protect those IIV-positive individuals who do not plan to have
sex or procreate but who, nevertheless, experience the kind of discrimination that the
ADA was designed to prevent. See id. at 431. The use of the "regarded as" prong as a
way of avoiding the proof problems raised by asymptomatic HIV was predicted by the
DOJ in the 1988 Memorandum. See 1988 Memorandum, supra note 105, at 274.
247. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C). The EEOC regulations use HIV infection to illustrate
the "regarded as" provision by noting that an employee fired because of a rumor about
HIV would be disabled because he was perceived by the employer as being disabled. See
29 C.F.R. § 1630 app. at 350 (1998).
248. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
249. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2214 n.1 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part).
250. See Chambers, supra note 167, at 406 ("[A]Il asymptomatic HIV-positive
individuals should qualify as disabled under the 'regarded as' prong of the ADA's
disability definition whenever they are subjected to purposeful unequal treatment because
of their HIV-positive status.").
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an impairment."'
The Supreme Court had previously considered the "regarded as"
prong of the handicap definition in Arline when it noted that allowing
discrimination based on the contagiousness of a disease would be
inconsistent with Congress's clear intent to prevent discrimination
based on the perception of disability. 2  In considering the intent of
Congress in enacting the "regarded as" provision, the Arline Court
suggested that the type of situation contemplated was one in which
an impairment did not actually limit a major life activity, but the
prejudices of others limited the person's ability to workP3 Rejecting
the argument that there is no handicap when only the ability to work
is impaired, the Arline Court asserted that the Rehabilitation Act was
intended to cover individuals with real or perceived disabilities that
limit the ability to work 5 4 The Arline Court thus affirmed that an
argument that depends upon the substantial limitation (real or
perceived) of the ability to work is not circular.25
In Harris v. Thigpen,16 the Eleventh Circuit used the "regarded
as" prong to hold that several HIV-positive inmates were disabled
under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Actl 7  The segregation of the
inmates indicated that they were perceived as unable to participate in
prison programs that were directly related to the major life activities
of working and learning." s Thus, the unusual circumstances of prison
life enabled the Harris court to relate discrimination in a § 504 case
to the major life activity of workingY9 An argument based on
perceived impairment of the ability to work generally will be
inappropriate for the plaintiff in a public accommodations case, and
251. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C).
252. See School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273,284 (1987); see also supra notes 91-104 and
accompanying text (discussing Arline).
253. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 282-83; see also Parmet & Jackson, supra note 82, at 14-16
(discussing the Arline Court's "regarded as" analysis).
254. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 283 n.10; see also Vande Walle, supra note 3, at 903-22
(surveying the use of the perceived disability argument in ADA employment cases).
255. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 283 n.10. As the Court implied in Bragdon, the major life
activity limited by the impairment (in this case reproduction) need not be related to the
discrimination (refusal to provide dental care). See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2205-06
(accepting Abbott's reproduction argument). Under the "regarded as" analysis, however,
a connection between the perceived substantial limitation and the resulting discrimination
seems inevitable.
256. 941 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1991), appeal after remand sub nom. Onishea v. Hopper,
126 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 1997), reh'g en banc granted and vacated, 133 F.3d 1377 (11th Cir.
1998).
257. See id. at 1524.
258. See id. at 1524 n.45.
259. See id.
1999] 1303
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
it will, therefore, be difficult under a "regarded as" analysis to avoid
bootstrapping a finding of disability to a finding of discrimination.20
Following the Arline dicta concerning the "regarded as" prong, a
plaintiff such as Abbott would still have to show that the frustration
of her attempt to participate fully in society constitutes a substantial
limitation on a major life activity.26' The inherent circularity of such
an argument is somewhat troubling: she is disabled because she is
discriminated against, and, therefore, she cannot be discriminated
against. Or even more reductively, freedom from discrimination
becomes the major life activity.2 62  Although the logic of the
"regarded as" analysis seems circular, the ADA clearly protects any
plaintiff who can identify a major life activity in which she has been
perceived as being substantially limited.2 63  Abbott, for instance,
might have argued that she was substantially limited in the major life
activity of obtaining health care.26 Justice Ginsburg suggested that
260. Courts have been troubled by the attempt to bootstrap a finding of impairment to
a finding of disability in the infertility cases. See Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95
F.3d 674, 677 (8th Cir. 1996); Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240, 243
(E.D. La. 1995), affd, 79 F.3d 1143 (5th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision). The
plaintiffs in these cases argued that infertility is an impairment of the reproductive system
and therefore that the substantial life activity of reproduction is substantially limited.
Courts have rejected this reasoning as "circular." See Krauel, 95 F.3d at 677; Zatarain, 881
F. Supp. at 243. The reproduction argument does not have the same "bootstrapping
effect" in the HIV cases in which HIV-not infertility-constitutes the physical
impairment.
261. Ms. Chambers has urged the Supreme Court to adopt the statutory construction of
the "regarded as" prong adopted by the Arline Court and to hold that persons with
asymptomatic HIV "may be impaired in a major life activity if they are discriminated
against because of the disease." Chambers, supra note 167, at 428. Although the Arline
Court did cite the inclusion of the "regarded as" prong as evidence of Congress's intent to
protect against not only actual but perceived disability, Ms. Chambers fails to note that the
Arline Court considered application of the "regarded as" prong only when the plaintiff
was regarded as being substantially limited in the major life activity of working. See
School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 283 (1987). The Arline Court's analysis is not so broad
as Ms. Chambers suggests but instead is faithful to the statutory requirements. See id. at
282-84; see also Parmet & Jackson, supra note 82, at 15 (interpreting Arline to suggest that
social prejudices against HIV could result in the substantial limitation of the major life
activity of working).
262. Urging the Court to decide Bragdon under the "regarded as" prong, Ms.
Chambers has proposed the broadest of interpretations of "regarded as": "HIV infected
individuals, even those who remain asymptomatic, may be impaired in a major life activity
if they are discriminated against because of the disease." Chambers, supra note 167, at
428.
263. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994).
264. Certainly discrimination in the provision of health care is a serious issue for
individuals with HIV infection, and denial of treatment is not the only means of
discrimination; BIV-infected individuals may also receive negligent care based on
prejudice about the disease. See Mark Jackson & Nan D. Hunter, "The Very Fabric of
Health Care". The Duty of Health Care Providers to Treat People Infected with HIV, in
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the ability to receive health care is a major life activity and that an
action such as Bragdon took in refusing to fill Abbott's cavity in his
office constitutes a substantial limitation of that activity.25 The
Court did not consider whether the ability to receive health care is a
major life activity, but it seems no less significant than working or
reproduction, the two major life activities expressly recognized by the
Court.266 Although Justice Ginsburg's construction seems consistent
with the ADA, the Court avoided the inherent circularity of the
"regarded as" prong of the disability definition as it applies in a
public accommodations case by holding that Abbott was actually
disabled. With the actual disability analysis, the Court recognized
Abbott's HIV infection as a present disability defined not by the
reactions of others but by the actual effects of the disease. The
"regarded as" prong, nevertheless, remains available to future HIV-
infected plaintiffs who are unable to prove actual substantial
limitation of a major life activity.267
Bragdon is perhaps most significant for its holding that
reproduction is a major life activity and for its suggestion by way of
dicta that "substantial limitation" may include non-physical
limitations. 268 The Court's opinion also appears to require an
individualized inquiry at the "substantially limits" stage of the three-
step analysis.269  Although this solution is consistent with the
statutory language and forestalls dangerous per se exclusions, the
burden remains on future asymptomatic HIV-infected plaintiffs to
prove that they are substantially limited in a major life activity.
Fortunately, however, the next asymptomatic HIV plaintiff who is
discriminated against in the provision of health care or other public
AIDS AGENDA: EMERGING ISSUES IN CIVIL RIGHTS 123, 124 (Nan D. Hunter &
William B. Rubenstein eds., 1992).
265. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2213-14 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg
was clearly receptive to the idea that Abbott was disabled because she was regarded as
being disabled and noted that HIV "has been regarded as a disease limiting life itself." Id.
at 2213 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see also Transcript of Oral Argument, Bragdon (No.
97-156), available in 1998 WL 141165, at *16 (suggesting in questions to petitioner that
limitations on access to health care constitute a substantial limitation of a major life
activity).
266. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2205; Arline, 480 U.S. at 283 n.10.
267. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C).
268. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2205-06.
269. See id. at 2207 (analyzing "substantial limitation" in terms of the substantial
limitation on the respondent's reproduction).
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service will not have to prove that HIV is a physical impairment or
that reproduction is a major life activity.270
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270. See id. at 2204-05.
